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ARTICLE 
LASTING LEGISLATION 
REBECCA M. KYSAR† 
This Article argues that, due to certain pathologies of the legislative 
process, legislation enacted with sunset provisions lacks benefits hailed in recent 
scholarship while also harming the political process and its output.  Proponents 
have argued that such “temporary legislation” enhances fiscal responsibility be-
cause official-cost estimates reflect the full cost of the legislation.  The cost esti-
mates, in other words, relay the entirety of expenses to Congress upon each sun-
set date.  In contrast, when enacting nontemporary legislation, the theory goes, 
Congress receives official costs only for the duration of the budget window, or 
the length of time set forth in the annual budget resolution, as the relevant pe-
riod within which Congress makes spending and revenue decisions.  
This theory is flawed.  Many factors—shifting baselines, exceptions to the 
revenue offset or “pay as you go” rules, costs that temporary legislation en-
genders beyond the budget window, and the ability of lawmakers to consider 
the full cost of legislation—thwart the theoretical fiscal restraint of temporary 
                                                          
† Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  I am grateful to Steven Bank, 
Brad Borden, Kim Brooks, Steven Dean, Mihir Desai, Kelly Dunbar, Richard Epstein, 
Michael Graetz, Ed Kleinbard, Michael Knoll, Wojciech Kopczuk, Doug Kysar, Ruth 
Mason, Susie Morse, Alex Raskolnikov, Mike Schler, Christopher Serkin, Darien 
Shanske, Dan Shaviro, Kirk Stark, David Walker, George Yin, Eric Zolt, and partici-
pants of the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Workshop, the Brooklyn Law School Junior 
Faculty Workshop, the Columbia Law School Tax Policy Workshop, the Federal Budget 
and Tax Policy for a Sound Fiscal Future Interdisciplinary Conference at Washington 
University School of Law, the Federalist Society’s Junior Scholars Panel, the Junior Tax 
Scholars’ Workshop, the McGill University Tax Policy Workshop, the New York City Ju-
nior Faculty Colloquium, the NYU Tax Policy Colloquium, the UCLA Tax Policy Work-
shop, and the University of Connecticut School of Law Faculty Workshop for helpful 
comments.  I would also like to give thanks to Josefina Colomar, Ruth DeLuca, and Ro-
bert McRae for their excellent research assistance, and to Bobbi Bullock for her out-
standing secretarial support.  Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the Dean’s Summer Re-
search Stipend Program at Brooklyn Law School for funding portions of my research. 
KYSAR REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2011  12:30 PM 
1008 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1007 
legislation.  Nor do sunset provisions tend to provide lawmakers with enhanced 
information or flexibility, as proponents of temporary legislation have argued; 
instead, lawmakers likely will be unable to determine the appropriateness of 
the sunset, or its most effective scope and length.  Furthermore, “pro-temporary 
legislation” scholars understate the costs of such legislation because temporary 
legislation increases rents from interest groups, entrenches current majoritarian 
preferences, and produces planning conundrums for public and private actors 
alike.  Accordingly, this Article recommends a policy presumption against tem-
porary legislation and in favor of legislation that does not expire by its own 
terms, or “lasting legislation.”  This presumption should be stronger in the con-
text of provisions made temporary due to budgetary constraints, where the iden-
tified concerns are more likely to arise, and weaker in emergency or experimental 
situations, where the identified concerns are less likely to exist.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article sets forth a view of the legislative process that accounts 
for the endogenous nature of the rules that govern it—that is to say, 
the enforcement of the rules governing the proposal, debate, and 
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adoption of legislation depends largely upon powers vested within, ra-
ther than without, Congress.1  Although Congress may adopt mechan-
isms—budget rules, for example—with lofty ambitions to legislate in 
the public interest and to promote fiscal responsibility, Congress is all 
but unfettered in its ability to sidestep these mechanisms when it sees 
fit.2  The endogenous nature of these rules, moreover, is not merely of 
academic interest in view of the constant and intense political pres-
sures on Congress to spend overly and unwisely.  Indeed, the endo-
geneity of the legislative process3 causes these political pressures to op-
erate on hydraulics:  although the pressures may be blocked at one 
channel, their power can still be exerted via another route. 
This starting point—that Congress governs the legislative process, 
if at all, through inherently weak, self-enforced rules—has substantial 
implications for the scholarly debate over “temporary legislation.”  
Specifically, this Article finds implausible recent claims that legislation 
enacted with sunset provisions,4 or temporary legislation, encourages 
fiscal restraint and deliberative decisionmaking.  Instead, the endo-
genous model outlined above predicts that, when encouraged by po-
litical pressures, legislators can elude the sunset provisions’ restraints 
on their behavior—a prediction borne out time and again by expe-
rience.  But temporary legislation is worse than ineffective:  such legis-
lation creates serious political-economy concerns, entrenchment 
problems, and planning disruptions.  For these reasons, this Article 
recommends a policy presumption against temporary legislation in 
                                                          
1 See Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress:  Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 553-62 (2009) (exploring the endogenous nature of leg-
islative rules through an analysis of Supreme Court and lower federal court case law). 
2 See, e.g., Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
805, 808 (2010) (arguing that Congress lacks the ability and incentives to enforce the 
“law of congressional lawmaking” upon itself). 
3 Some scholars have argued that legislators enact rules behind a Rawlsian “veil of 
ignorance” that forces them to formulate rules in the interests of society, rather than 
in their own.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 739 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in 
Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399, 403-05 (2001).  Specifically, legislators adopt rules 
without identifying who precisely will benefit or suffer from them—that is, in some-
thing like an “original position.”  Vermeule, supra, at 399.  Although normatively at-
tractive, this account lacks descriptive power.  Because legislative rules are endogen-
ous, they are subject to change and easily evaded by legislators.   
4 I use the term “sunset provisions” to mean those clauses that cause legislation to 
expire by its own terms.  This definition is derived from Black’s Law Dictionary, which 
defines a “sunset law” as a “statute under which a governmental agency or program 
automatically terminates at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally renewed.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (9th ed. 2009). 
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most cases, replaced with a presumption in favor of legislation that 
does not expire by its own terms, or “lasting legislation.”5 
Troublingly, however, Congress has escalated the use of tempo-
rary legislation; sunset provisions allow members of Congress to enact 
low-cost legislation and to avoid triggering rules that attempt to en-
force budget constraints.  At the beginning of the most recent cen-
tury, for example, more than one hundred sunset provisions threat-
ened tax legislation with automatic cessation, including some of the 
largest tax cuts in American history.6  In comparison, only a decade 
prior, in the early 1990s, less than two dozen relatively inconsequen-
tial tax provisions were set to expire.7   
Due to economic pressures and legislative rules that substantially 
favor the (apparent) low revenue costs of temporary legislation, the 
use of sunset provisions in the tax context is rampant.8  The conse-
quences of Congress’s increasing reliance on temporary legislation 
soon became clear at the end of 2010, when legislators renewed im-
portant pieces of tax legislation, such as the estate-tax repeal and the 
tax-rate reductions on dividends and capital gains.9  Evaluation of 
                                                          
5 I have chosen “lasting legislation” as the label for legislation that does not expire 
by its own terms, as opposed to the more common term, “permanent legislation,” in 
order to highlight that such legislation need not continue indefinitely and, indeed, the 
legislature is unlikely to conceive of it as such.   
6 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., LIST OF EXPIRING FED-
ERAL TAX PROVISIONS, 2009–2020 (Comm. Print 2010) (listing 251 expiring provi-
sions).  Sixty-nine provisions were due to expire in 2010 alone.  Id. at 14-26.  
7 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., DESCRIPTION OF TAX PRO-
VISIONS EXPIRING IN 1991 AND 1992 (Comm. Print 1991) (listing fifteen expiring provi-
sions); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., DESCRIPTION OF TAX PROVI-
SIONS EXPIRING IN 1990 (Comm. Print 1990) (listing eighteen expiring provisions). 
8 Shortly after the palpable rise in sunset provisions, I critiqued their impact on 
the budget process and the political economy.  See Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises:  
The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 339 (2006) 
(arguing that sunset provisions do not function as “good government” tools); see also 
William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Sunsets in the Tax Code, 99 TAX NOTES 1553, 1554-57 
& fig.1 (2003) (describing the prevalence of sunsets in tax legislation, especially in tax 
cuts from the past several years); Elizabeth Garrett, Comment, Accounting for the Federal 
Budget and Its Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 196-98 (2004) (providing examples of 
the effects of sunset provisions on budget rules and fiscal policy decisions); Elizabeth 
Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in U.S. Budget Process (discussing the role of 
transparency in principal-agent relationships and the positive and negative aspects of ac-
countability), in FISCAL CHALLENGES:  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POL-
ICY 68, 77-80 (Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter FISCAL CHALLENGES];  
Manoj Viswanathan, Note, Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code:  A Critical Evaluation and 
Prescriptions for the Future, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 656, 658 (2007) (arguing that sunset provi-
sions are used to enact lasting legislation under the guise of temporary legislation). 
9 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.). 
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temporary legislation, therefore, remains essential, especially in light 
of recent scholarship arguing strongly in its favor.10  Despite the heigh-
tened use of sunset provisions and these new defenses asserting their 
utility, this Article concludes that lasting legislation remains the pre-
ferred route to prudent lawmaking.   
Part I of this Article provides a brief historical overview of sunset 
provisions, focusing on their most recent incarnation in the Internal 
Revenue Code (the “Code”).  It then details the lack of external en-
forcement of legislative rules, concluding that the ensuing easy eva-
sion of such rules in the budget process has caused the rise in tempo-
rary legislation.11  For instance, sunset provisions reduce the cost of 
tax legislation, preventing a member of Congress from challenging 
the legislation as readily under “pay as you go” (PAYGO) rules, which 
                                                          
10 See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 298 (2007) 
(“Normatively, temporary legislation should not be globally eschewed, and at least in 
specific policy domains such as responses to newly recognized risk, there should be a 
presumptive preference in favor of temporary legislation.”); George K. Yin, Temporary-
Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 187-94 
(2009) (proposing presumption in favor of legislation that has a temporary effect on 
the nation’s budget); see also WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE 
SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME 142 (2004) (observing that sunsets can help with “legis-
lative obsolescence”); Martin A. Sullivan, False Alarms and Real Problems with Budget 
Gimmicks, 99 TAX NOTES 1129, 1132 (2003) (arguing that temporary provisions are not 
immune from repeal or expiration and that they must be “paid for” in the future when 
and if extended); Bruce Ackerman, Sunset Can Put a Halt to Twilight of Liberty, Op-Ed., 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at B15 (arguing that the PATRIOT Act be temporary); 
Frank J. Fagan, The Economic Rationale of Sunset Clauses 25 (Summer 2005) (unpub-
lished Master’s thesis, European Master in Law & Economics) (on file with author) 
(positing that sunset provisions allow policymakers to adjust efficiently to changing en-
vironments); cf. Neal Katyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237, 
1244-47 (2004) (advocating for the use of prospective declarations by courts that some 
of their opinions will sunset).  Professors Gersen and Yin refer to temporary legislation 
as temporary and temporary-effect legislation, respectively.  See, e.g., Gersen, supra, at 
247-48; Yin, supra, at 174.  This Article uses the term “temporary legislation” to de-
scribe legislation that expires by its own terms or employs sunset provisions.  This Ar-
ticle thus describes advocates in support of such provisions as “pro-temporary legisla-
tion” scholars.  For earlier pro-temporary legislation arguments, see STEPHEN BREYER, 
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 365-68 (1982), which noted that sunset provisions call 
for agency-by-agency regulatory reform, but may not always succeed.  See also Bruce 
Adams, Sunset:  A Proposal for Accountable Government, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 519-21 
(1976) (indicating that sunset provisions should incentivize government officials to 
evaluate the relevant program); Lewis Anthony Davis, Review Procedures and Public Ac-
countability in Sunset Legislation:  An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 
393, 407-08 (1981) (listing the qualities of effective sunset legislation); Dan R. Price, 
Sunset Legislation in the United States, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 401, 418-19 (1978) (describing 
sunset legislation as a way to offer a “governmental reform system” that “average citi-
zens can understand” and that would improve political accountability). 
11 See infra notes 36-54 and accompanying text. 
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are legislative rules that require spending decreases or tax increases 
to offset revenue-reducing legislation.12   
One predominant argument advanced recently in support of sun-
set provisions is that the legislative process accounts completely for 
the costs of temporary legislation but fails to do so for lasting legisla-
tion because the extension of temporary legislation requires congres-
sional action.  At the point of extension, the argument goes, Congress 
takes into account the full cost of the temporary program.  This cha-
racteristic is said to be in contrast to lasting legislation, the estimated 
costs of which are provided upon its single enactment only for the du-
ration of the budget window,13 and thus requires no further congres-
sional action to continue the legislation’s effects.  
A central problem with this argument for temporary legislation is 
that it assumes a proper functioning of background budget con-
straints.  To evaluate the theory in a more realistic scenario, Part II 
first explores several features of our byzantine budget process.  It as-
serts that the pro-temporary legislation view depends on the errone-
ous assumptions that the baseline estimate from which the legisla-
tion’s costs are measured will always treat temporary laws as 
temporary, that the length of budget windows will be constant, and 
that legislators will faithfully apply PAYGO rules to temporary legisla-
tion.  Unfortunately, nothing binds Congress to such procedural 
commitment devices, and, indeed, as will be shown, Congress has reg-
ularly deviated from them precisely in the manner posited.14 
Part II then demonstrates that temporary legislation often has 
economic effects beyond the budget window, even though such legis-
                                                          
12 H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(d) (2011) (providing PAYGO provisions for the 
House); S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. § 201 (2007) (setting forth the PAYGO “point of 
order” for the Senate budget process).   
13 The budget window is the length of time covered by the annual budget resolu-
tion, which in turn is the structure within which Congress makes spending and reve-
nue decisions.  See Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Leg-
islative Process, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 874 (2002) (“[T]he budget resolution serves as a 
fiscal blueprint or framework within which Congress makes its substantive deci-
sions . . . .”).  The length of the budget window has historically changed as a result of 
political preferences.  See Kysar, supra note 8, at 345 (noting that Republicans periodi-
cally modified the scope of the 2000 budget, switching between five and ten years).  
For a discussion of the appropriate length of budget windows, see Alan J. Auerbach, 
Budget Windows, Sunsets, and Fiscal Control, J. PUB. ECON. 87, 99-100 (2006), which 
noted, “[A]n optimal budget rule is one that places less weight on years further in the 
future, over and above normal discounting.  This reflects two factors:  policies an-
nounced for the future may not take effect and, if they do, that their impact will be felt 
more by those whom budget rules are intended to protect.” 
14 See infra Section II.A. 
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lation has a formal end date.15  In such cases, temporary legislation 
suffers from the same purported defect as lasting legislation in that 
the budget process will not account for costs beyond the budget win-
dow.  Although pro-temporary legislation scholars have maintained 
that temporary legislation can provide an official revenue estimate 
equivalent to its full cost and presumably allows Congress to make 
smarter decisions, there is currently no external enforcement me-
chanism to make Congress fully consider this estimate.  Thus, even if 
accurate and complete cost information regarding temporary legisla-
tion is available, there is no guarantee that the estimate will inform 
Congress’s decisionmaking.  On the other hand, if Congress does 
have incentives to consider the costs of legislation, then Part II de-
monstrates that Congress will likewise have the means to consider the 
full cost of lasting legislation, not just its officially stated cost within the 
budget window.   
Part III then asks whether sunset provisions afford congressional 
members an opportunity to review outdated policies and to enact leg-
islation that addresses only temporary concerns, which are two 
strengths commonly attributed to temporary legislation.  That Part an-
swers the question in the negative, albeit with qualifications.  It con-
tends that the breadth and aim of sunset provisions generally cast too 
large a net to capture only problematic policies.  Moreover, it also 
suggests rejection of efforts to limit temporary legislation to policies of 
uncertain or temporary significance, due to research that countervails 
behavioralist justifications for such usage.16  Part III then concludes 
that interest-group pressures often prevent lawmakers from utilizing 
information about the temporary legislation in question.  
Although one can lodge many of these same critiques against last-
ing legislation, temporary legislation has substantial, underacknow-
ledged disadvantages, which this Article describes in Part IV.  Specifi-
cally, the continuous threat of expiration allows Congress to extract 
more rents from interest groups through the use of sunset provisions 
                                                          
15 Professor Yin acknowledges this possibility; hence he limits his proposal, which 
favors sunsets, to “temporary-effect” legislation as opposed to merely “temporary” legis-
lation.  Yin, supra note 10, at 178 n.9.  This Article argues that a surprisingly high per-
centage of temporary legislation produces costs beyond the budget window.   
16 See, e.g., BETTER REGULATION TASK FORCE, ANNUAL REPORT 2000–2001, at 19 
(2001) (U.K.) (recommending the consideration of sunset clauses in “[r]ules made 
under the ‘precautionary principle,’ where there are significant scientific uncertainties 
and more information might lead to a different solution”); Gersen, supra note 10, at 
268 (“In recent years, experimental economists and cognitive psychologists have high-
lighted the plethora of cognitive biases that can affect the ways in which individuals 
perceive and make decisions about risk.”).   
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that require those groups repeatedly to return to the congressional 
floor to achieve their goals.  Additionally, because continuation of ex-
piring policies commands significant legislative resources, temporary 
legislation raises concerns of entrenchment of prior generations’ pol-
icies, interfering with a future Congress’s ability to set its own agenda 
while also creating an atmosphere of legislative uncertainty that dis-
rupts the planning activities of citizens and government actors. 
In light of these concerns, Part V of this Article recommends a 
policy preference against temporary legislation and in favor of lasting 
legislation, while identifying particular contexts in which this prefe-
rence should be strongest and those in which it should be weakest.  
The problems with temporary legislation are more likely to occur 
where legislators employ sunset provisions for revenue concerns, ra-
ther than for deliberative or other traditional policy functions, typical-
ly in the tax-cutting context.  In contrast, sunset provisions enacted in 
emergencies or for experimental purposes may avoid many of the 
provisions’ harmful tendencies.  For instance, a clearly demarcated 
crisis situation will make it less necessary for a future legislature to re-
visit the issue, hence avoiding entrenchment concerns somewhat; and 
will make it easier for the legislature to set an appropriate and more 
certain sunset date, thereby allaying planning concerns.  Additionally, 
once a crisis event ends, interest groups may also disband, reducing po-
litical-economy considerations.  It is possible, however, that interest 
groups will successfully lobby for continued benefits beyond those ne-
cessitated by the emergency; thus, legislators should still exercise cau-
tion in such usage of temporary legislation.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  History of Temporary Legislation 
Temporary legislation has a long history in American lawmaking, 
dating back to the Founding Era.17  Since then, the legislature has ap-
plied sunset provisions both narrowly and widely to legislation, gov-
ernment programs, and agency actions.  In Federalist No. 26, for exam-
ple, Alexander Hamilton supported the constitutional restriction of 
military appropriations to two-year periods to ensure that there would 
                                                          
17 In prior work, I have traced the use of sunset provisions and will thus do so only 
briefly here, focusing particular attention upon recent developments.  See Kysar, supra 
note 8, at 350-52 (sunset provisions in the Sedition Act of 1798); see also Gersen, supra 
note 10, at 250-55 (sunset provisions present in the Federalist Papers and enacted by 
the First Congress). 
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be renewed deliberation regarding status quo funding and to protect 
against the public’s short-lived passions.18  Under Hamilton’s view, the 
additional actions required to reenact temporary legislation would 
protect society from unwise or outdated policy.19  
Thomas Jefferson also argued famously in favor of sunset provi-
sions in his correspondence with Madison during the French Revolu-
tion, going so far as to propose that all laws, including the Constitu-
tion, “naturally expire[] at the end of 19. [sic] years.”20  Madison 
would later advocate during the Constitutional Convention for the 
employment of sunset provisions in cases of difficult policy decisions.21 
Many decades later, while serving as a Securities and Exchange 
Commission director in the Roosevelt Administration, William O. 
Douglas, influenced by the work of the prominent political theorist 
Theodore J. Lowi, would argue that agency capture provided a differ-
ent rationale for the sunsetting of agencies.22  This view would influ-
ence a series of government reforms in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.  Advocacy groups, such as Common Cause, promoted sunset 
provisions as a means of dislodging entrenched interest groups.23  
Building upon Justice Brandeis’s famous description of transparency 
rules as “the best disinfectant,” a Common Cause branch president 
suggested, “My God, we’ve done sunshine, how about sunset?”24  By 
the early 1980s, thirty-five states had enacted sunset laws that man-
                                                          
18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 168 (Alexander Hamilton) ( Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961).   
19 See Gersen, supra note 10, at 251 (remarking that Hamilton believed these “sub-
sequent stages of procedure” acted as a safeguard for the democratic process).  
20 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), reprinted in 6 
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 9 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).   
21 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911) (recording Madison’s argument that the renewal of sunsetting legislation—
rather than the repeal of lasting legislation—would be more effective in cases involving 
difficult policy decisions). 
22 See, e.g., WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN, THE EARLY YEARS:  THE 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 294 (1974) (“After [ten years, an agency] is 
likely to become a prisoner of bureaucracy and of . . . inertia . . . . This is why I told FDR 
over and over again that every agency he created should be abolished in ten years.”).   
23 See Kysar, supra note 8, at 351 (citing THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERAL-
ISM:  IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 309-10 (1969)).  Lowi 
argued that the annual appropriations process did not sufficiently guard against ex-
cesses of interest-group activity; historically, opposition from congressional members to 
appropriations was “disregarded or ruled out of order.”  LOWI, supra, at 310. 
24 Chris Mooney, A Short History of Sunsets, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 67, 68 
(quoting Craig Barnes). 
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dated periodic review of government agencies and other entities.25  
The vast majority of these broad sunset provisions were eventually 
abandoned after lobbying pressures produced reviews that were costly 
and of questionable utility.26  Although similar attempts to enact wide-
spread sunsets at the federal level failed,27 Congress did occasionally 
employ sunset provisions to garner support for controversial legisla-
tion and to address various problems identified as temporary.28   
Since the 1970s, Congress has applied sunset provisions to certain 
tax provisions, collectively known as “extenders.”29  Congress renews the 
vast majority of extenders upon the sunset date or shortly thereafter on 
a retroactive basis.30  Indeed, the popular research and development 
                                                          
25 COMMON CAUSE, THE STATUS OF SUNSET IN THE STATES:  A COMMON CAUSE RE-
PORT i (1982). 
26 See Kysar, supra note 8, at 354-57, for a summary of the rise and fall of state sun-
set provisions.  See also AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, ZERO-BASE BUD-
GETING AND SUNSET LEGISLATION 31-35 (1978) (listing common arguments against 
sunset provisions).  A New York Times article reported that Colorado’s sunset law cost 
the state $212,000 to review its agencies, while saving the state only $6810 upon the 
termination of three small agencies.  Facing Facts:  High-Priced Sunset, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
26, 1978, at A24. 
27 See Vern McKinley, Sunrises Without Sunsets:  Can Sunset Laws Reduce Regulation?, 
18 REGULATION, no. 4, 1995, at 57, 59-60 (noting as an example the failed passage of 
the Sunset Act of 1977). 
28 For instance, provisions in the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT 
ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.), which gave expanded enforcement 
tactics to the executive, were subject to a four-year sunset provision, id. § 224, 115 Stat. 
at 295, due to concerns for individual rights.  In a similar example, the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which banned assault weapons, contained a 
ten-year sunset provision in order to appease libertarian concerns.  Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
§ 110105, 108 Stat. 1796, 2000 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006)).   Con-
gress has also used sunset provisions to address temporary problems.  See, e.g., Job Crea-
tion and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 301, 116 Stat. 21, 33-40 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 38 (2006)) (expanding work opportunity tax credit to 
benefit New York City employees in the World Trade Center area following the Sep-
tember 11 terrorist attacks but setting a termination date of December 31, 2006).   
29 See Kysar, supra note 8, at 358 (describing several well known tax extenders and 
their purposes). 
30 See Jill Barshay, “Temporary” Tax Breaks Usually a Permanent Reality, CONG. Q. 
WKLY., Nov. 15, 2003, at 2831 (noting only one extender provision had expired in the 
twenty-five years that Congress had employed them); Ed Kleinbard, Speech to the 
American Bar Association (May 7, 2009) (noting that the “entire herd of ‘extenders’ is 
paraded through the legislative process as a unit . . . [a]nd just as good cowboys do not 
lose many yearlings, it is virtually unheard of for an ‘extender’ to get separated from 
the rest of the herd and not get renewed”), as quoted in Ryan J. Donmoyer, Bailout of 
U.S. Banks Give British Rum a $2.7 Billion Benefit, BLOOMBERG.COM (June 26, 2009), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=amp5wXx35fkc.  Out 
of the forty-one tax extenders due to expire in 2007, eleven provisions either expired 
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(R&D) credit has been temporarily extended numerous times since its 
inception approximately thirty years ago, typically on a one-year basis.31 
Beginning in 2001, Congress began to sunset important pieces of 
tax legislation in whole.  For instance, all provisions of the Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), which 
contained a phased-in repeal of the estate tax, had a sunset date of 
December 31, 2010.32  Two years later, Congress applied staggered 
sunset dates to most of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2003 ( JGTRRA).33  For instance, JGTRRA’s reduction of the 
dividend and capital-gains rates were scheduled to last until 2009, 
while the increased child-tax credit and the marriage-penalty relief 
provisions were scheduled to sunset at the end of 2004.34  EGTRRA 
and JGTRRA comprise two of the largest tax cuts in the history of the 
United States.35 
The proliferation of temporary legislation reflects both process 
(i.e., budgetary rules) and substance (i.e., fiscal pressures).36  PAYGO 
rules require revenue offsets for new revenue-decreasing legislation, 
                                                                                                                                 
or were made permanent, and of the twenty-one provisions that were due to expire in 
2008, only five expired.  Compare STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., 
LIST OF EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS, 2007–2020 (Comm. Print 2008), with 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., LIST OF EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX 
PROVISIONS, 2008–2020 (Comm. Print 2009). 
31 See Subcommittee on Contracting and Technology Hearing on Helping Small Business 
Innovators Through the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Small Bus., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Rep. Nye, Chairman, H. Sub-
comm. on Contracting & Tech.) (“Perhaps the greatest shortcoming in the R&D credit 
is its lack of permanence.  In the nearly three decades since its inception, the incentive 
has never been cemented.  Instead, it has been reauthorized 1 year at a time, often at 
the last minute, retroactively, and after the credit has expired.”). 
32 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, § 901(a), 115 Stat. 38, 150.  
33 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 
§§ 107, 303, 117 Stat. 752, 755-56, 764.  Most provisions of both JGTRRA and EGTRRA 
were extended by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 
Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.). 
34 See Fortney Pete Stark, JEC Report Decries “Short-Sighted” GOP Tax-Cutting Strategy, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, May 27, 2003, available at LEXIS, 2003 TNT 102-20 (describing the 
bill’s conference agreement). 
35 See Jonathan Weisman & Naftali Bendavid, Obama Eyes $300 Billion Tax Cut, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at A1 (comparing EGTRRA and JGTRRA to a proposed tax 
cut by President Obama). 
36 A report issued by an independent organization within the IRS, established to 
advance the interests and rights of taxpayers, enumerates the categories of budget 
rules, including PAYGO rules.  See 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 
TO CONGRESS 401-03 (2008).   
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such as mandatory spending or tax cuts.37  When a congressional col-
league fails to provide a revenue offset under an internal PAYGO rule, 
opposing legislators may enforce the PAYGO rule as they do other 
procedural rules of Congress:  by raising a “point of order.”38  If sus-
tained, the point of order will serve to strike the revenue-decreasing 
legislation from the bill.  The point of order may be waived according 
to the procedural rules of each house of Congress, usually by a simple 
majority of the Rules Committee in the House or by three-fifths of all 
members in the Senate.39  Violations of statutory PAYGO rules can re-
sult in sequestration, or a reduction in direct-spending programs, after 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determines that the leg-
islation decreases revenues.40  Sunset provisions reduce the cost of rev-
enue-decreasing legislation and, in this manner, require smaller offsets 
under the PAYGO rules.  The House and Senate budget committees 
calculate the cost of legislation for purposes of the PAYGO rule in a 
manner consistent with a now-expired provision of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.41  These estimates 
ignore sunset provisions for spending programs with current-year 
                                                          
37 For materials cataloging the House and Senate PAYGO rules, see infra note 39. 
38 A point of order is a procedure that allows a member of Congress to contest an 
action or a proposed action as a violation of the relevant house’s rules, practices, or 
procedures.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a point of or-
der as a “request suggesting that the meeting or a member is not following the appli-
cable rules and asking the chair to enforce the rules”). 
39 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 36, at 401 & n.24.  The House origi-
nally adopted its internal PAYGO rule on January 5, 2007, as part of H.R. Res. 6, 110th 
Cong. § 405 (2007).  The House adopted the current form of the rule on January 5, 
2011.  H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(d) (2011).  Unlike the Senate and statutory rules, 
the House rule applies only to direct spending and excludes tax cuts.  Id.  The Senate 
has had an internal PAYGO rule since 1993 but adopted the current form of the rule 
in May 2007 as part of the 2008 budget resolution.  See S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. 
§ 201 (2007) (adopting a PAYGO point of order).  See generally ROBERT KEITH, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL 34300, PAY-AS-YOU-GO PROCEDURES FOR BUDGET ENFORCEMENT 4 
(2007) (explaining the background of PAYGO rules in Congress).     
40 Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 5, 124 Stat. 8, 15 (to 
be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 900 et seq.).  This law replaced previous statutory PAYGO 
rules that were in effect from 1986 but expired in 2002.  See Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
iation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, § 13101, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-581 to 
1388-582 (amending the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 
Pub. L. No. 99-177, tit. II, 99 Stat. 1037). 
41 See H.R. Res. 5, 111th Cong. § 2( j) (2009) (requiring that the budgetary effect 
be measured against “baseline estimates” from the Congressional Budget Office, “con-
sistent with section 257 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985”); S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. § 201(a) (2007) (requiring the same consistency 
with the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 as the House).   
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costs greater than $50 million, but not for other programs.42  For pur-
poses of estimation in the tax-cutting context, the committees assume 
sunset provisions take effect even though, for the most part, tempo-
rary tax cuts do not expire but instead are routinely renewed.43  Be-
cause of the budgetary estimation practices, a proponent of temporary 
legislation will often face a lower risk of sequestration or of a col-
league raising a point of order against the legislation. 
Reconciliation, part of the budget process, also induces legislators 
to use sunset provisions.44  The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 in-
itiated this streamlined alternative lawmaking process, offering Con-
gress a fast track for passing deficit-reducing legislation.45  Generally, a 
reconciliation bill receives the benefit of special procedural rules that 
limit debate and thereby eliminate the threat of a filibuster.  Under 
this process, Congress passes a budget resolution that sets forth a limi-
tation on spending—a so-called “section 302 spending allocation”—
for each category of revenue and spending.46  Any provision that ex-
ceeds the allocation must be packaged with a revenue-raising measure.47  
Again, points of order enforce the procedural rules that set forth the 
mechanics of this process.  Because sunset provisions reduce the cost of 
revenue-decreasing legislation, they require smaller offsets to meet the 
section 302 spending allocations.  In estimating costs for purposes of 
                                                          
42 See 2 U.S.C. § 907(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (“No program . . . with estimated current 
year outlays greater than $50,000,000 shall be assumed to expire in the budget year or 
the outyears.”). 
43 See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules:  Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Consti-
tutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1090 (2003) (“Time-bound emergency legislation is often 
the subject of future extensions and renewals . . . .”). 
44 Note that reconciliation can be used in conjunction with PAYGO rules.  In such 
cases, there is even greater incentive to use temporary legislation.   
45 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 310(c), 88 Stat. 297, 
315-16 (detailing the reconciliation process).  For a discussion of the reconciliation 
process, see generally Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the 
Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387 (1998), Philip G. Joyce & Robert D. 
Reischauer, Deficit Budgeting:  The Federal Budget Process and Budget Reform, 29 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 429 (1992), Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution:  
The Anatomy of the 1995–96 Budget "Train Wreck," 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589 (1998), and 
James A. Miller & James D. Range, Reconciling an Irreconcilable Budget:  The New Politics of 
the Budget Process, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 4 (1983). 
46 See BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20144, ALLOCATIONS AND SUB-
DIVISIONS IN THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS 1-2 (2003) (detailing the workings 
of Congressional Budget Act section 302 in the budgetary process); see also Congres-
sional Budget Act of 1974, § 302, 88 Stat. at 308-09 (requiring an estimated budget al-
location with budget resolutions). 
47 ROBERT KEITH & BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33030, THE BUDG-
ET RECONCILIATION PROCESS:  HOUSE AND SENATE PROCEDURES 15, 40-41, 68 (2005). 
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reconciliation, the budget committees look to Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) and Joint Committee on Taxation ( JCT) estimates, 
which use the principles of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Defi-
cit Control Act of 1985, as do the PAYGO rules.48  Like the PAYGO 
rules, sunset provisions reduce the threat of points of order, at least 
where the sunset date occurs prior to the end of the budget window.  
Although the original intent of the reconciliation process was to 
provide an easier path to enact deficit-reducing legislation, in 2001, 
Republicans won a procedural battle by passing one of the largest tax 
cuts in history, EGTRRA, through the reconciliation process in order 
to avoid a filibuster.  This successful action set a strong congressional 
precedent for use of the reconciliation process to pass deficit-
increasing legislation.  Two years later, a section 302 spending alloca-
tion of $350 billion, demanded by centrist legislators, would inspire 
congressional Republicans to sunset provisions in JGTRRA, thus 
enacting deeper tax cuts than would have been possible had the cuts 
been permanent.49 
Another aspect of the reconciliation process, the Byrd Rule, fur-
ther encourages the use of sunset provisions.  Senator Robert Byrd in-
troduced this rule to guard against senators adding unrelated provi-
sions to the reconciliation bill.50  The Byrd Rule allows senators to raise 
a point of order against extraneous provisions, which can be waived 
only by three-fifths of the Senate.51  The Byrd Rule lists several catego-
ries of extraneous provisions, including reconciliation bills that de-
                                                          
48 See Issues in Reinstating a Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Requirement:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. 12 n.16 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on the Budget] (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget 
Office) (“The Budget Committees determine all estimates used to enforce Congres-
sional budget procedures.  To assist the Budget Committees, CBO analyzes the spend-
ing or revenue effects of specific legislative proposals.  For proposals that would amend 
the Internal Revenue Code, CBO is required by law to use estimates provided by the 
Joint Committee on Taxation.”); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 36, at 403 
(noting that PAYGO uses estimates consistent with the 1985 Act). 
49 See Charles E. Grassley, Senate Clears Jobs and Growth Package with Dividend Exclu-
sion, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 15, 2003, available at LEXIS, 2003 TNT 103-58 (referenc-
ing statements by moderate senators emphasizing that the cost of JGTRRA must not 
exceed $350 billion); Stark, supra note 34 (noting that the true cost of the 2001 tax cut 
is greater than its official cost because of the use of phase-ins and sunset provisions); see 
also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS:  THE FIGHT OVER 
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 186-205 (2005) (detailing attempts to meet the budget 
resolution of $1.35 trillion, including the sunsetting of some of the tax cuts). 
50 See Michael W. Evans, The Budget Process and the “Sunset” Provision of the 2001 Tax 
Law, 99 TAX NOTES 405, 408-10 (2003) (describing the reasoning behind the Byrd Rule).   
51 2 U.S.C. § 644(e) (2006).   
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crease revenues beyond the budget window.52  Because sunset provi-
sions eliminate costs outside the budget window,53 senators can employ 
them as safeguards against invocation of the Byrd Rule.54  For instance, 
the conference committee sunsetted the entirety of EGTRRA before 
the end of the budget window to avoid the Byrd Rule.55 
Finally, apart from the budget rules, financial constraints also spur 
legislators to reduce the estimated costs of legislation.  To appease 
constituents and their fellow lawmakers, members of Congress may 
employ sunset provisions to reduce costs.  The success of this strategy 
necessarily depends upon whether the threat of sunsetting appears le-
gitimate.  If so, lawmakers and constituents will accept the reduced 
costs that accompany a shortened time frame of legislation. 
B.  The Endogeneity of Legislative Rules 
In view of the previously discussed budget rules and fiscal pres-
sures, it is unsurprising that legislators have employed sunset provi-
sions with increasing frequency in the United States, particularly in 
the tax-cutting context, where revenue concerns are significant.  But 
this account of the rise of sunsets has an important implication:  the 
political drivers of recent sunset provisions often differ markedly from 
their originally conceived purposes, most prominently those aimed at 
continuing legislative oversight and engagement.56  To understand 
this evolution of sunset provisions, it is helpful to situate the budget 
process within a larger legal context. 
Legislative rules or internal rules that attempt to structure con-
gressional lawmaking and organization primarily govern the budget 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 This assumes that the sunset period is shorter than the budget window and any 
costs of the legislation also do not extend beyond the budget window.  Section II.B will 
discuss the latter point in detail. 
54 See Auerbach, supra note 13, at 99 (“[S]unsets . . . can be understood as optim-
al responses by governments seeking to satisfy their own spending and borrowing 
objectives.”). 
55 See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-16, § 901(a), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (stating that the Act’s provisions will not apply to 
any year after 2010).    
56 See Kysar, supra note 8, at 350-57, 404 (cataloguing sunset-provision purposes, 
such as preventing the entrenchment of outmoded and inefficient programs and cur-
tailing the capture of regulatory agencies by special interests).  Another historical pur-
pose of sunset provisions has been one of “intrinsic necessity,” such as the use of time 
limits to reward innovation of intellectual property.  See Fagan, supra note 10, at 11-13. 
KYSAR REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2011  12:30 PM 
1022 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1007 
process.57  Each house adopts its own set of legislative rules, upon 
which few constitutional limitations exist,58 and over which each house 
retains enormous flexibility and can unilaterally change or waive at 
any time.59  Generally, legislative rules are enforced only within Con-
gress by points of order, which are issued upon violations of the 
rules.60  According to Supreme Court precedent, each house’s author-
ity over its legislative rules derives both from the Rulemaking Clause 
of the Constitution, which states that “[e]ach House may determine 
the Rules of its Proceedings,”61 and from separation-of-powers con-
                                                          
57 Congress may enact legislative rules through statutes rather than resolutions.  
The former procedure, of course, requires the other house’s approval and the Presi-
dent’s signature.  Because of this external participation, some have argued that the 
Rules of Proceedings Clause of the Constitution, art. I, § 5, cl. 2, may bar the enact-
ment of legislative rules through statutes.  See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional 
Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 430 (2004) (“[I]t is plausibly the 
best reading of the Rule of Proceedings Clause that the power of each house to ‘de-
termine the rules of its proceedings’ is exclusive as well as permissive . . . .”).  Statutes 
that enact legislative rules generally contain clauses whereby each house retains the 
ability to change the rules unilaterally.  See, e.g., Honest Leadership and Open Gov-
ernment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 555, 121 Stat. 735, 774 (enacting internal 
rules of the Senate “with full recognition of the constitutional right of the Senate to 
change those rules at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the 
case of any other rule of the Senate.”).  The courts treat these provisions as endogen-
ous and therefore unreviewable. 
58 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2 
(mandating a minimum annual assembly of Congress); id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (requiring 
the origination of revenue bills in the House of Representatives); see also Vermeule, 
supra note 57, at 430 (reviewing constitutional limitations upon legislative rules). 
59 See Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XV, § 1(a), H.R. Doc. No. 110-
162, at 662 (2009) (providing that two-thirds of members voting may suspend a rule 
because a quorum is present); Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule V, § 1, as reprinted in 
S. Doc. No. 110-1, at 5 (2008) (providing that no suspension of a rule generally may 
take place without one day’s notice in writing or immediately upon the unanimous 
vote of the Senate); Stanley Bach, Legislating:  Floor and Conference Procedures in Congress 
(noting each house of Congress “is always free” to amend, waive, or repeal its own 
rules, even when enacted by statute), in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN LEGISLA-
TIVE SYSTEM 701, 702 ( Joel H. Silbey ed., 1994). 
60 See Michael B. Miller, Comment, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the “Polit-
ical” Political Question Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1341, 1346 (1990) (“A rule is not bind-
ing if it is not invoked; the rules have absolutely no effect unless a member brings 
them into play.”).   
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; see also, e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6-9 
(1892) (interpreting the Rulemaking clause to prohibit judicial review of a House rule 
concerning the constitutional “Quorum to do Business” requirement); Field v. Clark, 
143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892) (holding that the Court could not question Congress’s attes-
tation that the bill presented to the President for signature was identical to the one it 
passed).  Lower federal courts also have held that legislative rules are nonjusticiable.  
See Kysar, supra note 1, at 557-60 (canvassing lower federal court case law denying justi-
ciability of legislative rules). 
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cerns.  Courts seldom review legislative rules and often capitulate to 
Congress when they do.62  Indeed, no federal court has ruled upon the 
substance of a legislative rule regulating the enactment of legislation.63  
Nor has any federal court overturned a legislative rule unless the rule 
infringed upon individuals’ constitutional rights or ran afoul of other 
constitutional limitations.64 
Because they lack external enforcement mechanisms, legislative 
rules can be described as endogenous to the lawmaking process.65  Not 
surprisingly, waivers and violations of the rules are common.66  Their in-
stability becomes even more apparent after consideration of their use as 
a quasi-precommitment device.67  Especially in the budget context, leg-
islators may anticipate difficulty in future self-discipline; for this reason, 
they may create legislative rules that bind them to a committed path of 
fiscal responsibility, lest they be later tempted by the demands of consti-
                                                          
62 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1974) (holding that 
a taxpayer did not have standing to force publication of the budget of the Central In-
telligence Agency); Texas Ass’n of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States, 772 
F.2d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that Congress’s interpretation of a constitution-
al provision concerning the internal operation of Congress is “a nonjusticiable political 
question”); Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (reasoning that separa-
tion of powers permitted the court to refuse to decide questions of legislative rules, 
under the “equitable discretion” doctrine); Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1175 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (declining to review the House’s distribution of its committee seats); 
Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 195-97, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that a Repre-
sentative did not have standing to challenge the method of appropriations for the 
Central Intelligence Agency, due to concerns about the “intrusion of the courts into 
the proper affairs of the coequal branches of government”); Consumers Union of U.S., 
Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1345-46 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (de-
nying judicial review of congressional allocation of press passes). 
63 John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation:  A 
Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1791 (2003). 
64 See John C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress:  Further Notes on the Constitutionali-
ty of the Senate Cloture Rule, 20 J.L. & POL. 505, 533 (2004) (describing federal courts’ 
lack of interference with “purely internal” House or Senate rules that do not raise con-
stitutional concerns). 
65 Kysar, supra note 1, at 561. 
66 See, e.g., id. at 542-51 (listing deficiencies of and defections from a legislative 
rule that requires disclosure of special interest legislation). 
67 See id. at 528 (describing certain legislative “earmark” rules as “akin to precom-
mitment devices . . . in weak form”).  For other descriptions of legislative rules as pre-
commitment devices, see, for example, Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics:  The Dy-
namics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 512 n.43 
(1998), which states that supermajority and other institutional requirements “can op-
erate as precommitment devices to avoid collective action problems that reduce Con-
gress’s ability to achieve preferred policy outcomes.”  See also, e.g., Garrett, supra note 3, 
at 751 (identifying precommitment as a goal of some legislative rules); Nancy C. 
Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (labe-
ling a balanced-budget amendment as a precommitment tool). 
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tuents or interest groups offering votes and rents in exchange for tax 
cuts or spending.  However, unlike Jon Elster’s conception of precom-
mitment devices—which require an external force to bind the wavering 
individual68—legislative rules are self-governing and, accordingly, legis-
lators easily evade them.  Nonetheless, Congress initially put them into 
place with the goal of tempering later pressures to spend or reduce rev-
enues excessively; for that reason, they are a quasi-precommitment de-
vice.  Because these pressures become so great, however, and because of 
the endogeneity of budget rules, defection is common. 
Legislators can and will interpret budget rules in a manner that 
benefits their current desires for deficit-increasing legislation—for in-
stance, by allowing tax cuts to pass through the reconciliation process.69  
At other times, pressures to spend or to cut taxes force creative cir-
cumvention of the letter of some rules, if not their spirit.  For example, 
the use of the EGTRRA sunset provisions failed to trigger the technic-
al language of the Byrd Rule since that rule prohibited extraneous 
legislation that increased deficits beyond the budget window.70   
Although it is true that Congress, at times, enlists the assistance of 
the Executive Branch in effectuating its long-term budget goals, it has 
been able to override enforcement mechanisms of that branch.  For 
instance, the statutory PAYGO rules of the 1990s required that legisla-
tors offset any tax cuts or increases in entitlement spending with ac-
companying tax increases or spending cuts.71  If Congress did not 
meet these requirements, a presidential order for mandatory seques-
                                                          
68 See Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It:  Some Ambiguities and 
Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1759-60 (2003) (concluding that 
“the individual can enlist others in the effort to bind himself” while “[b]y contrast, 
there is nothing external to society” to bind society in its entirety).  For the foundational 
works in precommitment theory, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS:  STUDIES IN 
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND:  STUDIES IN 
RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, Eth-
ics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 83, 96-107 
(1984); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, in CHOICE AND 
CONSEQUENCE 57, 76-82 (1984). 
69 See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (describing the streamlined re-
conciliation procedures).  After the Senate Parliamentarian, the advisor for interpre-
tations of Senate procedure, expressed doubts about the use of reconciliation for tax 
cuts, party leaders promptly fired him in an unprecedented event.  Charles Tiefer, 
How to Steal a Trillion:  The Uses of Laws About Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409, 
412 (2001). 
70 See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (explaining the procedural re-
quirements of the Byrd Rule). 
71 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-580, tit. XIII, 
§ 13101, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-574 to 1388-583 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 900–
903 (2000)). 
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tration—an automatic reduction in certain nonexempt categories of 
mandatory spending—would be issued.72  Sequestration, however, was 
never ordered while the PAYGO rules were in effect.73  Instead, Con-
gress discovered ways to avoid sequestration.  For instance, in order to 
enact EGTRRA without triggering sequestration, a conference report 
required the entity responsible for PAYGO accounting, the OMB, to 
zero out PAYGO balances in 2001 and 2002.74  In total, when statutory 
PAYGO rules were in effect, Congress enacted seven laws that altered 
PAYGO balances.75  These examples illustrate the fragility of the budg-
et process, which again stems from the endogeneity of legislative rules 
and the political appetite for government spending and tax cuts.76  
                                                          
72 Id. 
73 Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, supra note 48, at 5 (statement of Peter 
R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office). 
74 H.R. REP. NO. 107-350, at 114 (2002) (Conf. Rep.); see also Block, supra note 13, 
at 866 (discussing Congress’s avoidance of a 1999 sequester using a similar technique). 
75 The seven laws are the following:  Reduction of Preexisting PAYGO Balances, 
Pub. L. No. 107-312, § 1, 116 Stat. 2456, 2456 (2002); Department of Defense and 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist 
Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 102, 115 Stat. 2230, 
2342; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 2, 114 Stat. 2763, 
2763-64; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. 106-113, §§ 1001(a)–(c), 113 
Stat. 1501, 1536-37; Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 10213, 111 
Stat. 251, 712; Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 4001, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-500; and Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 
Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 14003(c), 107 Stat. 312, 685. 
76 The assignment of responsibility to the OMB of calculating deficits for the pur-
pose of sequestration is a result of a Supreme Court decision.  In Bowsher v. Synar, the 
Court held unconstitutional the triggering of sequestrations by an official accountable 
to Congress for separation-of-powers reasons.  478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986).  Congress 
can direct the OMB, in determining whether to order sequestration, to use certain es-
timates such as those produced by CBO or the Budget Committees, “as long as the es-
timates [are] embedded in the enacted legislation,” either explicitly or by reference.  
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, supra note 48, at 12 (statement of Peter R. 
Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office); see also Hershey Foods Corp. v. USDA, 
158 F. Supp. 2d 37, 41 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that Congress can “incorporate by cross-
reference in its bills” without violating the Presentment Clause).  That being said, the 
President can still veto any legislation containing this effective waiver of PAYGO, as 
with any other legislation passed by Congress.   
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II.  THE BUDGET PROCESS AND TEMPORARY LEGISLATION 
A.  Budget Rules 
 1.  The Instability of Baseline Estimates 
It is against this background of endogenous budget rules that we 
must examine potential benefits of temporary legislation.  Recently, 
Professor George Yin has argued that Congress should favor tempo-
rary legislation—or at least such legislation that has only temporary 
budgetary effects—because it enhances fiscal restraint at the federal 
level.77  This restraint, he argues, is due to the legislative process’s 
complete reckoning for the costs of temporary legislation, in contrast 
to the incomplete accounting for lasting legislation.78  Yin notes that 
extension of temporary legislation requires affirmative action by Con-
gress; at such point of action, Congress must account for the full cost 
of the temporary program within overall budget constraints.79  When 
enacting lasting legislation, on the other hand, Congress typically only 
has the estimated costs generated during the budget window, usually a 
five- or ten-year period.  Because the legislation need not be reconsi-
dered for its effects to continue, Yin argues, Congress does not con-
sider costs outside of this period.80  For this reason, the theory goes, 
the official cost of the legislation underestimates its full cost since leg-
islators will ignore any forgone revenues beyond the budget window.81 
To illustrate Yin’s argument, assume that Congress wishes to enact 
a tax cut with an estimated cost of $2 billion per year for the next 
twenty years.  Party leaders, however, have also agreed upon a budget 
constraint of $10 billion for the assumed budget-window period of ten 
years.  There are two legislative options, as shown in Table 1 below:  
Option #1, a $2 billion-per-year tax cut that sunsets after Year 5, or 
Option #2, a lasting tax cut half the size of the one originally contem-
plated.  Ignoring time-value-of-money issues, each produces an offi-
cial-cost estimate of $10 billion over the budget window period of ten 
years.  From the vantage point of a twenty-year horizon, however, the 
full cost of the lasting tax cut is $20 billion whereas the full cost of the 
                                                          
77 See Yin, supra note 10, at 181 (“This Article challenges the positions of [sunset] 
critics and explains why fiscal restraint may be enhanced with greater use of temporary-
effect legislation, such as legislation with sunsets, and less use of permanent legislation.”). 
78 Id. at 192-94. 
79 Id. at 193. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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temporary legislation remains consistent with the official cost of only 
$10 billion.  This means that the official-cost estimate for the perma-
nent legislation fails to take into account $10 billion of costs. 
 
 
Table 1:  Illustration of Yin’s Thesis:  Comparison of Official Cost, 
Full Cost, and Unaccounted-for Cost of Temporary and 
Lasting Tax-Cut Legislation82 
 
  
Full Cost   Official Cost 
Unaccounted-
for Cost      
(Full – 
Official Cost) 
Years 
1-5 
Years 
6-10 
Years 
11-15 
Years 
16-20 
Years 
1-20  
Years 
1-10 
Years 
11-20 
Years 
1-20 
Option #1          
Year 1:     
Tax Cut 
with Five-
Year 
Sunset  
10 0 0 0 10   10 N/A 10 0 
Year 6:     
Five-Year 
Extension 
of Sunset  
N/A 10 0 0 10   10 N/A 10 0 
TOTAL                    0 
Option #2                      
Year 1: 
Lasting 
Tax Cut 
(half as 
large)  
5 5 5 5 20   10 N/A 10 10 
TOTAL        10 
 
 
In this example, if the legislature pursues Option #1, it can renew 
the five-year sunset at the end of Year 5.  The temporary legislation 
would again produce equality between the official-cost and full-cost 
estimates of $10 billion over the next ten years.  Alternatively, if the 
legislature had initially passed a lasting tax cut, it would not need to 
extend the legislation in Year 6.  Both options fit within the budget 
constraint of $10 billion for the years in which legislation is passed.  
Option #1, however, produces full costs of $20 billion and no unac-
counted-for costs, whereas Option #2 produces full costs of $20 billion 
and unaccounted-for costs of $10 billion. 
                                                          
82 This example is loosely derived from a hypothetical scenario in Yin’s article, 
which aims to illustrate why temporary-effect legislation enhances fiscal restraint.  See 
Yin, supra note 10, at 237-39, 237 tbl.4. 
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Yin’s thesis—that temporary legislation produces accurate official-
cost estimates and lasting legislation does not—suffers from a reliance 
upon the stability of the baseline estimate.83  The official cost of legisla-
tion is the difference between the amount of government revenues that 
occurs with the enactment of the legislation and the baseline (or the 
amount that would occur in the legislation’s absence).  For Yin’s thesis 
to hold, the baseline estimates must assume that “permanent laws will 
continue forever but that temporary laws will expire as scheduled.”84 
The history of temporary legislation, however, demonstrates why 
this assumption is unwarranted.  Not only are baseline estimates endo-
genous and therefore subject to manipulation by Congress, but the po-
litical pressures for spending and tax cuts are great.  We can therefore 
expect—and have indeed already witnessed85—intentional alteration of 
the baseline to lower the perceived costs of temporary legislation. 
Typically, the baseline accepts current law as fixed; because the 
baseline assumes temporary provisions expire as scheduled, revenues 
are projected to increase at the sunset date (in the case of sunsetting 
tax cuts).  Accordingly, making permanent or extending the temporary 
provisions of EGTRRA and JGTRRA would eliminate or delay the in-
crease in revenues, and instead such legislation would be scored as a 
revenue loss.86  Confronted with the costs of renewing the temporary 
provisions of EGTRRA and JGTRRA, President George W. Bush pro-
posed in his 2006–2009 Presidential Budgets that the baseline would no 
longer assume that current law would expire according to its terms.87  
He proposed that the baseline should instead assume that such tax cuts 
were permanent, despite their adoption as “temporary.”  When com-
pared against this baseline, a permanent extension of the tax cuts 
would be scored with zero costs because the shifted baseline already as-
sumed that the temporary cut would become permanent.  Moreover, a 
                                                          
83 For a critique of baseline estimates, see Timothy J. Muris, The Uses and Abuses of 
Budget Baselines, in THE BUDGET PUZZLE:  UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL SPENDING 41 
( John F. Cogan et al. eds., 1994).   
84 Yin, supra note 10, at 186. 
85 This point will be illustrated in the following discussion. 
86 See Cheryl D. Block, Budget Gimmicks (describing the maneuver), in FISCAL 
CHALLENGES, supra note 8, at 39, 58. 
87 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES:  BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 
222 (2008) [hereinafter OMB, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2009], available at http:// 
www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/spec.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MAJOR SAVINGS AND REFORMS IN THE PRESIDENT’S 2008 
BUDGET 203 (2007), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/ 
savings.pdf; Block, supra note 86, at 58. 
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temporary extension of the cut would result in an apparent increase in 
revenues because the failure to permanently extend the tax cut would 
now be scored as a revenue gain over the assumed baseline.88  
Then–CBO Director, Peter Orszag, criticized this perhaps shock-
ing manipulation of the baseline by arguing that “scoring expiring 
provisions as entailing no budgetary cost after their expiration, but 
then assuming their extension in the baseline, would cause the costs 
of extending those provisions to ‘disappear’ from the process—which 
would substantially undermine its integrity.”89  Despite such criticisms, 
two years later, Orszag, as OMB Director for President Barack Obama, 
incorporated several of the EGTRRA and JGTRRA tax cuts perma-
nently into the baseline in the President’s 2010 and 2011 Budgets, 
with expiring provisions enacted subsequent to Obama taking office.90  
Although the Obama Administration justifies such baseline treatment 
                                                          
88 See OMB, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2009, supra note 87, at 222 (recognizing 
that not extending EGTRRA and JGTRRA in the baseline “raises inappropriate proce-
dural road blocks to extending them at current rates”).   
89 Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, supra note 48, at 10 (statement of Peter 
R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office).  Some have argued that this altera-
tion to current baseline practices is justified because current baseline calculations favor 
spending over tax cuts.  See, e.g., JAMES HORNEY & RICHARD KOGAN, CTR. ON BUDGET 
AND POLICY PRIORITIES, KEY ARGUMENT AGAINST APPLYING PAY-AS-YOU-GO TO TAX 
CUTS DOES NOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY 1 (2007), available at http://www.cbpp.org/ 
files/3-22-07bud.pdf (quoting former OMB Director Rob Portman as stating that 
“there is a bias [in the baseline rules], in my view, for spending and a bias against tax 
relief.  Why?  Because we assume that programs go out indefinitely on the spending 
side. . . . Whereas on the tax side, we assume the tax relief would not continue.” (alte-
rations in original)).  Generally, entitlement provisions and tax provisions are treated 
the same for purposes of calculating the baseline.  There is a special rule that provides 
for continuity in the baseline of temporary programs with annual outlays of more than 
$50 million that were enacted prior to 1997.  Id. at 1, 5.  This advantage for spending 
increases is generally offset, however, by the fact that the CBO scores new entitlement 
programs, even if temporary, as if they were permanent (that is, for every year of the 
budget window, including those past the program’s sunset date).  Id. at 5-6. 
90 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS app. (2009), available at http:// 
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/grnbk09.pdf (“Most of the 
tax reductions enacted in 2001 and 2003 expire on December 31, 2010.  The Adminis-
tration’s baseline projection of current policy continues all of these expiring provisions 
except for repeal of estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes.”); OFFICE OF MGMT. 
& BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES:  BUDGET OF 
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 170 n.5 (2010) [hereinafter OMB, ANA-
LYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2011], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
budget/Analytical_Perspectives (“[T]he Budget, in the current policy baseline, as-
sumes continuation of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts as amended through June 
2009 . . . . Among other changes, this continues two amendments made to these tax 
cuts . . . [which] expand child tax credit refundability and the earned income tax cre-
dit for married couples.”). 
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because it follows current policy, as opposed to current law, it even as-
sumes tax cuts that it does not support within the baseline.  Thus, 
when the administration fails to support the Bush tax cuts for high-
end taxpayers, it scores this policy stance as a revenue increase.91  
Importantly, the Congressional Concurrent Budget Resolution for 
Fiscal Year 2010 follows this practice of current policy baselines by also 
granting authority to the Chairman of the House Budget Committee to 
exclude the billions of dollars of budgetary effects ensuing from the ex-
tension of the EGTRRA, JGTRRA, and alternative-minimum-tax relief 
provisions.92  This effectively adjusts the baseline for all purposes of 
House business to assume current policy continues rather than expires.  
Finally, under current statutory PAYGO rules and proposals, discussed 
below in subsection II.A.2, the baseline assumes temporary tax legisla-
tion to be permanent.  Because these proposed changes to the calcula-
tion of the baseline do not apply to new temporary tax cuts, the perma-
nence of any such future tax cuts would not be assumed within the 
baseline.  This would start anew the process whereby the baseline is 
shifted in order to fail to account for the costs of permanent extension. 
To continue with the above hypothetical and to illustrate the ef-
fects of a baseline shift, let us again assume that Congress wishes to 
enact a tax cut costing $2 billion per year for twenty years, but is con-
strained by a cap of $10 billion in tax cuts during the budget window.  
How would Yin’s thesis, which ignores sunsets in the baseline, fare 
under Bush’s or Obama’s budget?  As illustrated in Table 2 below, 
temporary legislation would no longer have a budgetary advantage 
over lasting legislation; the unaccounted-for cost in both scenarios 
would be $10 billion because the official costs of the temporary legisla-
tion for Years 6–15 would be reduced to zero due to the alteration of 
the baseline.  In essence, Congress would not confront the full costs of 
renewing temporary legislation because the official costs would be 
measured through an accounting fiction in which the temporary legis-
lation had somehow already been renewed, thereby leading to the in-
corporation of renewal costs within the budget baseline even at the time 
that the renewal decision is on the table.  That is, the costs of deciding to 
                                                          
91 See OMB, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2011, supra note 90, at 187-88 tbl.14-3 (fo-
recasting that failing to extend the 20% rate for upper-income taxpayers will have a 
positive effect on revenues).  The Administration does not contend that this revenue 
increase can be used to pay for tax cuts under PAYGO rules, but instead that it “must 
be devoted to deficit reduction.”  Id. at 182 n.7. 
92 S. Con. Res. 13, 111th Cong. § 421 (2009). 
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renew would appear to be zero because the basis on which costs are es-
timated would assume that the renewal had already occurred.93 
 
Table 2:  Comparison of Official Cost, Full Cost, and 
Unaccounted-for Cost of Temporary and Lasting 
Tax-Cut Legislation with Baseline Assuming 
Permanence of Temporary Legislation 
 
  
Full Cost   Official Cost 
Unaccounted-
for Cost      
(Full –
Official Cost) 
Years 
1-5 
Years 
6-10 
Years 
11-15 
Years 
16-20 
Years 
1-20  
Years 
1-10 
Years 
11-20 
Years 
1-20 
Option #1          
Year 1:     
Tax Cut 
with Five-
Year 
Sunset  
10 0 0 0 10   10 N/A 10 0 
Year 6:     
Five-Year 
Extension 
of Sunset 
with 
Baseline 
Change 
N/A 10 0 0 10   0 N/A 0 10 
TOTAL                    10 
Option #2                      
Year 1: 
Lasting 
Tax Cut 
(half as 
large)  
5 5 5 5 20   10 N/A 10 10 
TOTAL        10 
 
 
Although the CBO has yet to alter the baseline in this manner, 
history suggests this possibility is far from remote. Indeed, we have 
previously seen examples of Congress—driven by political pressures—
directing the scoring practices of the CBO in an aggressive manner by, 
for example, demanding that the CBO set the PAYGO balance to zero 
                                                          
93 One could argue that in Option #2, Congress might approve another tax cut in 
Year 6, given its willingness to approve a temporary tax cut in that time frame under 
Option #1.  In such a case, the initial “advantage” of temporary legislation has not been 
eliminated.  Because of the endowment effect, however, it will be much easier politically 
to argue for extension of expiring tax cuts than to enact new tax cuts in Year 6.  See infra 
note 95 and accompanying text.  Additionally, if Congress enacts an additional tax cut 
as temporary under Option #2 in Year 6, the above discussion still applies such that any 
baseline shift will reduce the budgetary advantage for that piece of legislation. 
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in order to avoid sequestration under PAYGO.94  Such pressures are 
not simply of historical interest:  it is possible that the public will view 
an expiration of the EGTRRA and JGTRRA tax cuts as the largest tax 
increase in history,95 thereby providing Congress with strong political 
incentives to reduce the perceived cost of making such cuts perma-
nent.  Indeed, these same pressures have caused the OMB under Pres-
idents Bush and Obama to calculate its baseline in an unprecedented 
manner.  Furthermore, the statutory rules that governed the manner 
in which the CBO calculated baseline estimates have expired, thereby 
giving the CBO more flexibility in constructing its baseline.96   
To reiterate, the problems identified above arise in the tax legisla-
tive process due to the endogeneity of the rules governing the proposal 
and adoption of legislation.  Put differently, the foxes are guarding the 
henhouse.  And because Congress can alter the budget rules without 
interference from the other branches, it is likely that budget pressures, 
coupled with a popular preference for tax cuts, will someday cause the 
CBO to assume permanence of temporary tax cuts in its baseline pro-
jection, thereby creating the convenient fiction that subsequent re-
newal of tax cuts is costless. 
In fact, such pressures have already induced the House Budget 
Committee to effectively do this for purposes of House PAYGO rules, 
as discussed below in subsection II.A.2.  This development not only 
signals a trend in altering budget rules to accommodate the reenact-
ment of temporary tax cuts but also drastically reduces the significance 
of the CBO’s baseline on congressional decisions regarding such ree-
nactment.  Currently, PAYGO rules function as the primary budgetary 
mechanism through which lawmakers are forced to consider a propos-
al’s costs as measured against the baseline.  Moreover, in addition to 
estimates from the CBO, executive-branch estimates of the costs of leg-
islation, particularly if they are formalized in the OMB, may affect how 
legislators and their constituents view the costs of proposed legisla-
                                                          
94 See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing examples of zeroing 
out PAYGO balances). 
95 See Kysar, supra note 8, at 391 (discussing the view that taxpayers may process 
the expiration of the tax cuts as a tax increase due to the “endowment effect”—the 
phenomenon that people place greater value on that which they have rather than on 
that which they do not have).   
96 The CBO currently chooses to create its baseline calculations by following the 
now-expired provisions of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
of 1985 and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.  
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:  FISCAL YEARS 2010 
TO 2020, at 99 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10871/01-
26-Outlook.pdf. 
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tion.  For instance, under the George H. W. Bush Administration, the 
OMB estimated that a reduction in capital-gains tax rates would in-
crease revenues due to the churning of long-term assets.97  The CBO, 
however, estimated a reduction in revenues from such a policy change, 
initially causing the legislation to fail PAYGO requirements.98  None-
theless, the dispute between estimates raged for years until Congress 
eventually reduced capital-gains rates.99  Similarly, one can think of the 
change in baseline estimates advanced by the past two administrations 
as at least partially incorporated into the official-cost estimate of legis-
lation.  Because this change significantly reduces the official cost of re-
newing temporary legislation, it seriously challenges the conclusion 
that temporary legislation leads to fiscal prudence more readily than 
does lasting legislation. 
 2.  PAYGO Forgone 
As discussed above,100 each house currently has an internal PAYGO 
rule,101 and Congress has recently enacted a statutory PAYGO rule that 
the executive branch can enforce with mandatory sequestration.102  
Current trends indicate that Congress will continue to exempt many 
expiring tax provisions from PAYGO’s reach, further showing that the 
endogeneity of these rules undermines any fiscal prudence instilled by 
sunset provisions. 
The PAYGO rules of the House and Senate forbid consideration 
of direct-spending legislation and, in the case of the Senate, revenue 
legislation that results in deficit increases or surplus reductions, as 
measured over both a six-year period and an eleven-year period.103  
Like other legislative rules, the strength of the PAYGO rules is te-
nuous.  House rules are especially weak because they are not self-
                                                          
97 ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET:  POLITICS, POLICIES, PROCESS 170 (3d 
ed. 2007). 
98 Id.   
99 Id.   
100 See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory PAYGO 
rules of the 1990s and 2000s, and noting Congress’s successful efforts to avoid seques-
tration while the PAYGO rules were in effect).   
101 See supra note 39 for a discussion of the PAYGO rules for each house. 
102 See Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 5(b), 124 Stat. 8, 
15 (“If the annual report . . . shows a debit on either PAYGO scorecard for the budget 
year, OMB shall prepare and the President shall issue and include in that report a se-
questration order that, upon issuance, shall reduce budgetary resources of direct 
spending programs by enough to offset that debit . . . .”). 
103 H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(d) (2011); S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. § 201 (2007).   
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enforcing—that is, they require a representative to raise affirmatively a 
point of order—and because the House commonly waives its rules.104  
Waiver standards in the Senate are stricter, requiring a three-fifths 
vote after a point of order has been raised, although recently the Se-
nate has supported waiver of its PAYGO rules for temporary tax legis-
lation.105  The rules rely on the Budget Committee’s budgetary esti-
mates, as measured against the CBO baseline estimates.106  As 
discussed above, however, the Congressional Concurrent Budget Res-
olution for Fiscal Year 2010 provided that the Chairman of the House 
Budget Committee could ignore the majority of the sunsetting tax 
cuts for purposes of providing estimates for House rules.107  Accor-
dingly, PAYGO did not apply to, and offsets were not required for, 
these temporary provisions.   
Current statutory PAYGO rules enacted at the beginning of 2010 
also exclude many expiring tax cuts.  They incorporate within the 
baseline trillions of dollars of spending and revenue reductions, in-
cluding making permanent many of the EGTRRA and JGTRRA tax 
cuts, as well as the costs of extending alternative-minimum-tax relief 
and permanently reenacting the estate-tax exemption at 2009 levels.108 
Arguably, Congress could just as easily exempt lasting tax cuts from 
PAYGO rules.  The mechanics of a sunset provision, however, make it 
more likely as a political matter to obtain an exemption from PAYGO 
for temporary legislation.  First, due to the endowment effect—the 
cognitive phenomenon by which people place greater value on that 
                                                          
104 For instance, the House Rules Committee, with approval from a simple majori-
ty of the House, often adopts special ad hoc rules for consideration of certain legisla-
tion (particularly budgetary legislation), which waive any points of order, including 
those under the PAYGO rule.  An affirmative vote of two-thirds by the representatives 
may also suspend all House rules, allowing no points of order.  Rules of the House of 
Representatives, Rule XV, H.R. Doc. No. 110-162, at 662-81 (2009).   
105 See Bob Cusack & Mike Soraghan, House Leaders Reject Senate’s AMT Fix, THE 
HILL (Dec. 7, 2007, 11:42 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/news/13830-house-
leaders-reject-senates-amt-fix (“Senate Democratic leaders, fearful of a public backlash 
if they didn’t pass the AMT fix, reluctantly agreed Thursday to waive pay-as-you-go 
rules and passed their measure 88–5.”). 
106 Id.; see also S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. § 201(a)(5)(A) (2007) (requiring that 
estimates “use the baseline surplus or deficit used for the most recently adopted con-
current resolution on the budget”). 
107 See S. Con. Res. 13, 111th Cong. § 421(a) (2009) (permitting the Chairman to 
“exclude from his evaluation the budgetary effects of [legislative] provisions if such 
effects would have been reflected in a baseline adjusted for current policy”). 
108 See H.R.J. Res. 45, 111th Cong. § 7 (2010) (providing for adjustments of estimates 
of budgetary effects of PAYGO legislation for current policy in four areas of the budget).   
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which they have than on an identical item which they do not have109—
the public may feel entitled to the benefits that current tax law bestows, 
creating too much political pressure to refuse reenactment.110  Indeed, 
I have previously argued that, in 2002, Congress let lapse the prior sta-
tutory PAYGO rules so that permanent extension of the EGTRRA tax 
cut would be easier.111  Second, it may appear more legitimate to ex-
empt current law, rather than future law, from new legislative rules 
simply to preserve the “status quo.”   
To conclude, sunset provisions escape characterization as tools 
of fiscal responsibility through shifting baselines and exceptions to 
the revenue-offset or PAYGO rules.112  These phenomena disaffirm 
the purported fiscal prudence of temporary legislation. 
B.  Effects of Temporary Legislation Beyond the Budget Window 
A second fundamental problem with the defense of sunsetting is 
that temporary legislation often will have economic effects beyond the 
budget window, notwithstanding a sunset date.  To be sure, Yin con-
dones only temporary legislation “whose budget effect does not extend 
past the budget window period,” or “temporary-effect legislation.”113  
This Article contends, however, that temporary-effect legislation may 
be rarer than expected. 
One example of this phenomenon in the tax context is the tem-
porary § 965 dividend.114  This dividend allowed U.S. corporations a 
one-time opportunity to receive a deduction for eighty-five percent of 
“repatriated” dividends received from their foreign subsidiaries 
                                                          
109 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:  The Prob-
lem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 674 (1999) (describing an endow-
ment effect as when “an individual comes to possess an item, [and then] instanta-
neously (or nearly so) values that item more than she did prior to possessing it”). 
110 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining that because of the en-
dowment effect, the public may view an expiration of the EGTRRA and JGTRRA tax 
cuts as representing a particularly large tax increase, thereby motivating Congress to 
lower the perceived cost of maintaining them permanently).   
111 See Kysar, supra note 8, at 384 (arguing that the sunset provisions contributed to 
the executive branch’s refusal to support the continuation of the PAYGO rules that 
applied to tax cuts). 
112 The manipulation of other budget rules is less politically costly than repeal-
ing outright the PAYGO rules because the latter are more transparent and known to 
the public.   
113 Yin, supra note 10, at 178.  Yin also explains that permanent legislation, the 
long-term costs of which budgetary estimates do not account for, stands in contrast to 
temporary-effect legislation, the budgetary effect of which is confined to the budget 
window.  Id. 
114 I.R.C. § 965 (2006).   
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against the normal income tax imposed on such dividends, so long as 
the dividends were invested domestically.115  Although § 965 did not 
technically have a sunset date, its effect was limited in duration; the 
deduction was available for the first tax year beginning after October 
22, 2004, or, alternatively at the taxpayer’s election, for the taxpayer’s 
last tax year beginning prior to that date.116   
For the first prospective tax year of § 965’s effects, the JCT esti-
mated that § 965 would increase revenues by $2.8 billion, as measured 
against the baseline.117  Although temporary in design, the JCT esti-
mated that the provision would produce long-term revenue losses for 
every year thereafter in the ten-year budget window, totaling $3.3 bil-
lion.118  The pattern of revenue losses makes it likely that the JCT 
would have estimated losses as continuing beyond the budget window 
if so required.119   
The JCT arrived at its projection by using dynamic estimates, 
which account for changes in taxpayer behavior after enactment of 
the proposed legislation.120  The up-front revenue gains were due to 
taxpayers repatriating their foreign earnings when, without the provi-
sion, they had no intention of so doing.121  These gains were offset 
somewhat by losses from those taxpayers who would have repatriated 
their earnings regardless of the enactment of § 965, although at a 
higher tax rate.122  The future losses of revenues were those that would 
have been received from this latter group of taxpayers over the rest of 
the budget-window period.123  Additionally, such losses were amplified 
                                                          
115 Id. § 965(a)(1). 
116 Id. § 965(f). 
117 Edward D. Kleinbard & Patrick Driessen, A Revenue Estimate Case Study:  The Re-
patriation Holiday Revisited, 120 TAX NOTES 1191, 1191 (2008).   
118 Id. at 1191.   
119 See id. at 1197 (explaining the JCT’s process for determining and updating its 
estimate); Yin, supra note 10, at 178 n.9 (describing the § 965 dividend as an exam-
ple of temporary legislation that may not be temporary-effect legislation because it 
still could have long-term budget effects that continue throughout a ten-year budget 
window).   
120 See Kleinbard & Driessen, supra note 117, at 1193 (stating that JCT revenue es-
timates are dynamic because they incorporate taxpayer reactions to change).   
121 See id. at 1199 (“The JCT staff referred internally to this . . . as ‘induced’ divi-
dends, because section 965 induced taxpayers to pay the dividends when those taxpay-
ers otherwise would have been expected . . . to keep the funds permanently reinvested 
offshore.”).   
122 Id. at 1199-200. 
123 Id.  Note also that JCT staff is forbidden from accounting for the time-value-of-
money benefits from receiving revenues earlier rather than later (and vice versa).  Id. 
at 1200-01. 
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by the JCT’s conclusion that taxpayers would expect future temporary 
“tax holidays,”124 similar to § 965, and would keep earnings offshore 
indefinitely.  In this way, the JCT spread out $1 billion of additional 
costs over the budget-window period to reflect the inability of the 
United States to tax such earnings in the meantime.125  Later, the head 
of the JCT described this estimate of future taxpayer behavior as “very 
conservative.”126  The § 965 example underscores that there are many 
cases in which temporary legislation will face the same critique as last-
ing legislation—namely, that the budget process does not account for 
costs that occur beyond the budget window.  
Table 3 illustrates this principle.  Using our previous example, as-
sume that Congress wishes to enact a tax cut costing $2 billion per 
year for twenty years but is constrained by an overall cap of $10 billion 
in tax cuts during the budget window of ten years.  Assume further 
that dynamic scoring of the five-year temporary version of this tax cut 
produces $10 billion in costs inside the budget window, but $5 billion 
in costs outside the budget window due to changes in taxpayer beha-
vior arising from the tax cut.  This is also the case upon a five-year ex-
tension of the sunset.  In this instance, the unaccounted-for cost of the 
temporary legislation equals that of lasting legislation.  Of course, 
these unaccounted-for costs need not rise to the levels produced by 
the lasting legislation, as in this example, but they need not be lower 
either.  A generalized comparison is unattainable without specific 
knowledge of the future costs at issue. 
 
 
  
                                                          
124 Id. at 1200. 
125 Id. 
126 Id.   
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Table 3:  Comparison of Official Cost, Full Cost and Unaccounted-for 
Cost of Temporary and Lasting Tax-Cut Legislation Where 
Temporary Legislation Produces Costs 
Beyond Budget Window 
 
  
Full Cost   Official Cost 
Unaccounted-
for Cost      
(Full – 
Official Cost) 
Years 
1-5 
Years 
6-10 
Years 
11-15 
Years 
16-20 
Years 
1-20  
Years 
1-10 
Years 
11-20 
Years 
1-20 
Option #1          
Year 1:     
Tax Cut 
with Five-
Year 
Sunset  
10 0 5 0 15   10 N/A 10 5 
Year 6:     
Five-Year 
Extension 
of Sunset  
N/A 10 0 5 15   10 N/A 10 5 
TOTAL                    10 
Option #2                      
Year 1: 
Lasting 
Tax Cut 
(half as 
large)  
5 5 5 5 20   10 N/A 10 10 
TOTAL        10 
 
 
 The example of § 965 is not an outlier.  Indeed, the JCT estimates 
that many expiring provisions have costs well outside their expiration 
date and throughout the budget window.  For instance, in the last JCT 
report analyzing legislation addressing the extenders, the JCT scored 
approximately thirty-five percent of the extenders as having budget ef-
fects throughout the ten-year budget window despite having sunset 
provisions primarily of one or two years in length.127  Other JCT reports 
                                                          
127 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET 
EFFECTS OF THE “TAX EXTENDERS AND ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX RELIEF ACT OF 
2008” SCHEDULED FOR CONSIDERATION ON THE SENATE FLOOR ON SEPTEMBER 23, 2008 
(Comm. Print 2008), available at http://www.jct.gov/x-69-08r.pdf.  Such provisions in-
clude:  (1) tax-free distributions from IRAs to certain public charities, (2) R&D tax 
credit, (3) fifteen-year straight-line cost recovery for certain retail investments, (4) basis 
adjustment to S-corporations making charitable contributions of property, (5) credit 
for mine-rescue-team training, (6) credit for holders of qualified zone academy bonds, 
(7) accelerated depreciation for business property on Indian reservations, (8) in-
creased rehabilitation credit, (9) tax incentives for investment in the District of Co-
lumbia, (10) abatement of incentive–stock option alternative minimum tax (AMT) lia-
bility, (11) recovery-period adjustment for farming business machinery and 
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affirm the prevalence of this trend.128  Although the JCT did not project 
outside of the budget window, it is likely that the costs do not simply 
disappear at the end of the budget window given that they generally 
continue eight to nine years after the sunset date.  A more robust and 
dynamic analysis of taxpayer behavior may produce even higher rates of 
temporary legislation with effects beyond the budget window.129  
In sum, temporary legislation in many instances inflicts costs out-
side the budget window, which will not always outweigh the unac-
counted-for costs of lasting legislation.  When they do, however, the 
enactment of lasting legislation is preferred from the standpoint of 
accurate cost estimation.   
C.  Estimating Full Costs 
As the prior analysis illustrates, opportunities for manipulation 
created by the endogeneity of budget rules call into question the supe-
riority of temporary legislation over lasting legislation in producing 
official-cost estimates that match full costs.  Such endogeneity mutes the 
ability of the rules to emit signals that effectively constrain pressures to 
spend.  Congress can change or waive the rules to pursue current poli-
cy, ignoring official-cost estimates, and there is little, if any, external en-
forcement of them.  For this reason, a leading economist has concluded 
                                                                                                                                 
equipment, (12) tax treatment of mental health and substance use disorder benefits; 
(13) special allocation of private-activity-bond financing, (14) low-income housing cre-
dit allocation, (15) increase in rehabilitation credit, (16) credit to holders of Midwes-
tern tax-credit bonds, (17) penalty-free withdrawals from retirement plans for qualified 
disaster-recovery-assistance distributions, (18) tax-exempt bond financing and low-
income housing tax relief for Hurricane Ike areas, (19) expensing of qualified disaster 
expenses, and (20) relaxation of mortgage-revenue-bond limitations for presidentially 
declared disasters.   
128 A recent JCT report exploring various policy options in energy taxation iden-
tified at least four tax credits with a one- or two-year sunset provision that had budg-
et effects for the entirety of a five-year budget window.  STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. 
ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES FOR ENERGY PRODUCTION AND 
CONSERVATION 110 tbl.9 (Comm. Print 2009), available at http://www.jct.gov/ 
publications.html?func=startdown&id=3554.  These provisions are the following:  (1) 
manufacturer credit for energy-efficient homes; (2) hybrid-vehicle tax credit; (3) al-
ternative-fuel-vehicle credit; and (4) refined-coal credit. 
129 One should note that, to the extent temporary legislation produces costs that 
the relevant budget scorekeeper estimates as occurring beyond the budget window, 
some of their purposes fade.  For instance, such legislation would trigger the Byrd 
Rule.  See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.  It is not always the case, however, 
that the official cost will account for costs beyond the budget window.   
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that although the U.S. budget rules may have produced “some success 
at deficit control,” such conclusions are “highly tentative.”130   
On the other hand, if Congress does have incentives to consider 
the costs of legislation, then worthy of critical examination is the as-
sumption that, in enacting lasting legislation, Congress will necessarily 
ignore costs outside the budget window.  Indeed, Congress may take in-
to consideration the full cost of lasting legislation, as well as the official-
cost estimates.131  First, interest groups—at least when competing for 
scarce governmental resources—may have incentives to highlight to 
Congress the full costs of lasting legislation beyond the budget win-
dow, even when budget scorekeepers do not.132 
Second, if the projected costs of lasting legislation are sufficiently 
daunting, legislators (on pain of political retribution) may well take in-
to account such costs even if, falling outside the budget window, they 
are not officially scored.133  Good-government reform groups often 
analyze the CBO’s estimates, sometimes offering their own long-term 
projections.134  Constituent concerns and ideological views may also 
drive legislators to protect the fiscal health of the country. 
Historically, congressional members have analyzed an estimate of 
the costs of legislation outside the budget window in a variety of con-
texts, including consideration of the Bush tax cuts.135  Indeed, the sun-
                                                          
130 Alan J. Auerbach, Federal Budget Rules:  The US Experience, 15 SWEDISH ECON. 
POL’Y REV. 57, 81 (2008). 
131 This is a possibility that Yin recognizes but underappreciates.  See Yin, supra 
note 10, at 204-05 (acknowledging the “shadow” role of continuing costs in permanent 
legislation). 
132 See Garrett, supra note 67, at 504-05 (arguing that budgetary offset require-
ments create competition among interest groups that ultimately results in the produc-
tion of information, leading to enhanced legislative deliberation and accountability). 
133 See SCHICK, supra note 97, at 32 (“Shifts in public opinion impact the budget by 
weakening or strengthening fiscal discipline in the White House and Congress. . . . It is 
highly probable that even in the absence of [budget] rules, big deficits would have de-
terred Congress and the president from establishing new entitlements and impelled 
them to seek savings in old ones.”). 
134 See, e.g., GUY “ROLAND” KING & DONALD N. MUSE, CRITIQUE OF CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE FOR THE “SMALL BUSINESS HEALTH FAIRNESS ACT OF 
2005” (H.R. 525), available at http://www.realtor.org/small_business_health_coverage. 
nsf/docfiles/CritiqueofCBO.pdf/$FILE/CritiqueofCBO.pdf (finding fault with the 
CBO’s estimates of the people who would benefit from an act concerning coverage of 
certain health plans); Nicholas Loris, CBO Grossly Underestimates Costs of Cap and Trade, 
THE FOUNDRY ( June 22, 2009, 4:25 PM) http://blog.heritage.org/2009/06/22/ 
cbo-grossly-underestimates-costs-of-cap-and-trade (listing analysis problems that led the 
CBO to underestimate the costs of a climate-change bill).   
135 See STAFF OF S. BUDGET COMM., 109TH CONG., COST OF BUSH TAX CUTS EX-
PLODES OUTSIDE FIVE-YEAR BUDGET WINDOW (Comm. Print 2005), available at 
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set provisions of JGTRRA show that Congress’s concerns extend 
beyond the formal budget process’s constraints.  The JGTRRA tax 
provisions were made temporary, in part, to reduce the costs of the 
legislation as agreed upon by the legislators in light of a growing defi-
cit, rather than simply to comply with PAYGO or the Byrd Rule.136  For 
these reasons, interest groups, constituents, and political ideology may 
spur congressional members to heed the full costs of legislation and to 
downplay misleading official costs—thus reconciling, to an extent, the 
accounting differences between temporary and lasting legislation.   
It is also possible, however, that given the pressures to spend and 
reduce taxes, Congress pays attention only to those estimates that vi-
olate congressional norms.  It is reasonable to conclude that, in addi-
tion to restrictions formally put into place in the official budget 
process, informal processes such as those enumerated above may gen-
erate such norms.  Both sets of norms, however, may not be of equal 
strength or of much strength at all. 
III.  THE INFORMATION-PRODUCING AND FLEXIBILITY FUNCTIONS OF 
TEMPORARY LEGISLATION 
A.  Deliberation and Temporary Legislation 
In addition to the theory that sunset provisions enhance fiscal re-
sponsibility, pro-temporary legislation scholars also tout their informa-
tion-producing functions, as well as the flexibility they offer to legisla-
tors when dealing with temporary or uncertain problems.  Both theory 
and experience with sunset provisions call into question these pur-
ported benefits.   
Default rules can be seen to differentiate temporary legislation 
from lasting legislation.  The former terminates without further legis-
lative action, while the latter indeterminably remains in effect.  Some 
                                                                                                                                 
http://budget.senate.gov/democratic/charts_taxcuts.html (using CBO data to illu-
strate the $1.8 trillion ten-year cost of the Bush tax cuts, including costs five years 
outside the budget window); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ADDITIONAL INFORMA-
TION ON THE ESTIMATED BUDGETARY AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF S. 2611 (2006), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/72xx/doc7208/s2611.pdf (estimating costs 
outside the ten-year budget window in response to a request from senators consider-
ing the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006); STAFF OF S. BUDGET 
COMM., 109TH CONG., COST OF AMT REFORM EXPLODES OUTSIDE FIVE-YEAR BUDGET 
WINDOW (Comm. Print 2005), available at http://budget.senate.gov/democratic/ 
charts_taxcuts.html (using CBO data to estimate costs of AMT reform beyond the 
budget window). 
136 See Kysar, supra note 8, at 378-82 (chronicling the debates over and passage of 
JGTRRA and highlighting the Act’s sunset provision). 
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scholars have argued that this difference saves the legislature transac-
tion costs when it wishes to enact new policy; sunset provisions are ad-
vantageous when the initial policy is likely to be incorrect.137  The leg-
islature, this argument runs, may use better information revealed dur-
during the interim period between enactment and sunset.138  There 
are, however, several problems with this account. 
First, lasting legislation, of course, need not be permanent.  In-
deed, I have labeled legislation that does not expire by its own terms 
as “lasting” rather than “permanent” to highlight this distinction.  
Congress can repeal or amend lasting legislation that had been 
enacted based upon poor information, thereby providing the flexibili-
ty benefits that advocates of temporary legislation tout.  To provide a 
recent example, Congress enacted legislation in 1993, as part of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codifying the Department of 
Health and Human Services’s travel ban upon HIV-positive foreign 
nationals.139  Subsequently, in 2008, Congress amended the INA to lift 
the ban, reflecting a new scientific consensus about the lack of health 
risks associated with such travel.140 
Additionally, if the initial policy is correct, then lasting legislation 
will be the appropriate course of action.  Otherwise, Congress will in-
cur unnecessary transaction costs in an effort simply to maintain the 
status quo by reenacting the legislation at sunset.141  Accordingly, to 
                                                          
137 See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 10, at 271 (contending that temporary legislation 
provides a more “pragmatic approach to new risk[s]” inherent in legislation); Fagan, 
supra note 10, at 19 (arguing that, as opposed to permanent legislation, sunset provi-
sions ”may reduce the cost” of an erroneous policy decision when new, better policy 
options arise). 
138 See Gersen, supra note 10, at 266-67; Fagan, supra note 10, at 19. 
139 National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 
§ 2007, 107 Stat. 122, 210 (1993); see also 139 CONG. REC. S1761-67 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 
1993) (chronicling the debate on the merits of a ban on the immigration of HIV-
positive foreign nationals). 
140 See Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
293, § 305, 122 Stat. 2918, 2963 (2008) (striking the language prohibiting immigration 
of those with AIDS). 
141 It could be argued, however, that temporary legislation actually functions as a 
type of penalty default rule and thus enhances deliberation.  See Ian Ayres & Robert 
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:  An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE 
L.J. 87, 95-97 (1989) (recommending that a court can justifiably invalidate a contract—
as a type of penalty default rule—when the contracting parties strategically shift con-
tract costs to the courts by leaving out key terms ex ante).  By returning Congress to a 
less desirable policy position, a sunset provision may prompt Congress to take action.  
However, unlike the Ayres and Gertner proposal, which applies only when parties at-
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use sunset provisions optimally, the legislature must foresee whether 
faulty information underlies the legislation or whether intervening 
events will occur that would necessitate revised policy—perhaps an 
unlikely scenario.142 
In many cases where sunset provisions are hypothesized to be use-
ful—that is, when incorrect policy influences legislation—legislators 
may ignore superior information that arises before or at the sunset 
date and instead succumb to preformed policy preferences.143  Such 
willful ignorance of superior information may result from the failure 
of deliberation to sway congressional members.  This lack of success 
may in turn be due, in part, to the influence of interest groups.144  As 
mentioned above, the experience with sunsets at the state level in the 
1970s and early 1980s, as well as that of the tax extenders, suggests that 
sunset provisions do not function as an effective means of policy re-
view.  Instead, interest groups continue to coalesce at each sunset date 
in order to advance their interests.145  This arrangement proves lucra-
tive to lobbyists and congressional members, who benefit from the re-
                                                                                                                                 
tempt to shift costs onto courts, a presumption in favor of temporary legislation would 
be overly broad since it prompts Congress to act in all types of situations.   
142 The ability to foresee conditions that will make a law obsolete is, of course, not 
impossible.  For instance, portions of the New Deal were temporary because legislators 
were contending with problems perceived as temporary.  See, e.g., Theodore Saloutos, 
New Deal Agricultural Policy:  An Evaluation, 61 J. AM. HIST. 394, 403 (1974) (noting the 
temporary nature of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which decreased crop 
production to combat deflation because of the assumption that “the Depression was 
going to end”).  However, the difficulty in correctly identifying such situations is com-
pounded by the challenge in defining the scope and length of the sunset provision.  See 
infra Sections III.B-C.   
143 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550 
(1988) (“The antonym of deliberation is the imposition of outcomes by self-interested 
and politically powerful private groups; republicans emphasize that deliberative 
processes are often undermined by intimidation, strategic and manipulative behavior, 
collective action problems, adaptive preferences, or—most generally—disparities in 
political influence.”).   
144 See id. (highlighting the role of interest groups, or “politically powerful private 
groups,” in political outcomes).  Economic critiques of interest-group influence high-
light the disconnect between the preferences of constituents and the goals of enacted 
legislation.  This incongruence may be attributed to “strategic and manipulative beha-
vior,” “cycling problems,” and the lack of a mechanism to gauge intensity of prefe-
rences, among other factors.  Id. at 1545-46.  But cf. Fagan, supra note 10, at 27 (ar-
guing that more legislators will vote on a law “[i]f elections occur between a law’s 
enactment and review,” thus “reducing the probability of legislative capture, de-
creas[ing] errors in objective facts upon which the law is based, and decreas[ing] er-
rors of representing the subjective values of citizens”). 
145 See infra Section IV.A (exploring this phenomenon in greater depth).   
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peated provision of rents upon each sunset.146  Although scholars are 
correct to point out that, at times, temporary legislation receives in-
tense legislative attention,147 such attention may simply be the product 
of lobbying efforts rather than deliberation over new information.148 
Some also suggest that, because of the necessity of legislative ac-
tion upon the sunset date, temporary legislation produces repeated 
interactions between interest groups and legislators, which in turn in-
centivize the former to provide better information to the latter.149  But 
continuous relationships are a double-edged sword:  frequent interac-
tion may lead to a capture scenario in which the legislator is acting for 
the interest group rather than a broader constituency, regardless of 
presented information.150  When the consequences of legislative pro-
                                                          
146 See infra Section IV.A (discussing incentives that public interest groups give to leg-
islators in the form of campaign contributions, votes, or other benefits called “rents”). 
147 See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 10, at 276-77 (noting that while many pieces of 
temporary legislation command limited lawmaker attention, budget rules requiring 
“setoffs for new spending programs” may lead to increased scrutiny of temporary legis-
lation); see also Mary L. Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform:  Improving Program 
Oversight Under the Government Performance and Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751, 
798-801 (2000) (stating that the threat of sunset for employment tax credit produced 
more information about its performance).   
148 Whether the product of such lobbying efforts is to be embraced as representing 
an equilibrium of political power or rejected as unsupported by reason and deliberation 
invokes the classic debate between pluralists and republicans—a debate in which this 
Article does not attempt to engage.  Compare Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 875-76 (1987) (characterizing plural-
ism as the political theory wherein “legislative outcomes simply reflect the equilibrium 
of private political power”), with Sunstein, supra note 143, at 1544, 1547-49 (describing 
republicanism as the view that laws should be developed through deliberation and be 
supported by reason, not through blind acceptance of the products of politics). 
149 See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 10, at 271-72 (citing political science models that 
support the hypothesis that lobbyists are more honest in repeated, rather than isolated, 
interactions with legislators).   
150 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 144 (2d prtg. 1971) 
(noting that “the organized and active interest of small groups” can achieve legislative 
results other than what would be expected under majority rule); David Martimort, 
The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies:  Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs, 66 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 929, 929 (1999) (arguing that regulatory capture arises from the re-
peated interactions between “political principals, interest groups, and regulatory 
agencies”); see also MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION 155-60 (1955) (arguing that regulatory commissions tend to become 
heavily influenced by those interest groups that they regulate); Samuel P. Hunting-
ton, The Marasmus of the ICC:  The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 
YALE L.J. 467, 473-509 (1952) (discussing capture of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission by railroad-industry interests); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regula-
tion, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (discussing industry pursuit of regulation 
to control market entry and to preserve market dominance).  Some have argued that 
capture theory is more potent in the legislative rather than regulatory context because 
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posals affect certain interest groups acutely but members of the public 
diffusely, the former will exert resources—and will be able to do so 
quite effectively if they are well organized—to capture influence with 
lawmakers while the public remains inattentive.151  We can theorize, 
then, that lawmakers are more attuned to the needs of interest groups 
the more they interact with them, thereby increasing the risk that an 
unreliable exchange of information occurs in the sunset scenario.152   
A final problematic feature of temporary legislation with respect to 
information gathering is that it may produce over- and underrespon-
siveness, which spoils the information that the legislature considers 
upon the sunset date.153  For instance, taxpayers may attempt to struc-
ture their transactions to capture tax benefits during the sunset period 
of a tax cut.  Fearful that the tax cut will not be extended, a large beha-
vioral response to the temporary legislation may not necessarily indi-
cate taxpayer reaction to a lasting tax cut; rather, taxpayer response is 
simply compressed into a shorter time frame.154  To illustrate the con-
verse, some have argued that a private party may underreact to tempo-
rary (as compared to permanent) environmental regulation if the 
regulation requires costly alterations in behavior and is unlikely to be 
extended.155  These examples illustrate that the sunset mechanism may 
                                                                                                                                 
politicians do not guarantee  independence or impartiality as agencies do.  See, e.g., 
DAMIEN GERADIN & MICHEL KERF, CONTROLLING MARKET POWER IN TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS:  ANTITRUST VS SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION 113-14 (2003) (asserting that sta-
tutory provisions that constrain the political make-up and regulatory discretion of the 
Federal Communications Commission make it less susceptible to “agency capture”). 
151 See OLSON, supra note 150, at 141-48 (explaining attempts at regulatory capture 
by special interest groups).   
152 It is, of course, true that lawmakers are likely not focused only on rent extrac-
tion.  Indeed, in contrast to earlier strains of public-choice theory, more recent scho-
larship accepts an expansive view of lawmakers’ preferences to include satisfaction of 
their ideologies, as well as the accumulation of power and prestige, the presence of 
which may contribute to meaningful deliberation.  See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Pub-
lic Choice and Public Interest:  A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation 
in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 66-68 (1990) (criticizing legal scholarship that adopts 
a narrow view of public-choice theory for ignoring legislative motivations other than 
extracting rent); see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 148, at 888-90 (arguing that pub-
lic-choice theory improperly rejects legislative and voter concern for the public inter-
est).  Still, although the rent-extraction model may not present a complete picture of 
the legislative process, it predicts the tendencies of the interactions between interest 
groups and lawmakers.   
153 See Gersen, supra note 10, at 278 (“[O]bserved level of behavioral adjustment 
would be an inaccurate indicator of how private parties would respond to permanent 
legislation.”).   
154 Id.   
155 See, e.g., id.   
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not only fail to compel legislatures to consider new information but 
may itself produce distorted data.   
B.  Setting the Scope of Temporary Legislation 
In addition to their questionable effects, sunset provisions may 
simply fail to target the right legislation.156  Judge Guido Calabresi, for 
example, has criticized sunset provisions for their overbreadth, ar-
guing that they threaten expiration of still-beneficial laws.157  Interest 
groups who lobby for the scope and length of the sunset provision 
most favorable to their agenda exacerbate this problem.  Indeed, a 
group of senators heavily criticized the proposed Sunset Act of 1977, 
which would have subjected all federal programs to a five-year sunset, 
because interest groups had lobbied successfully to delete tax expend-
itures from the sunset review.158 
Perhaps these concerns have inspired scholars to prescribe tem-
porary legislation only in certain scenarios, such as those presenting 
new or unfamiliar risks.159  Because new risks are thought more likely 
to inspire biased perception and overreaction, scholars advocate tem-
porary legislation in uncertain environments to offset the effect of the 
biases.160  Specifically, their argument draws upon literature arguing 
that individuals “often overestimate and overreact to newly recognized 
risks.”161  This tendency is due to risk assessment based on whether in-
                                                          
156 It may seem odd that we trust Congress to enact complex legal regimes but not 
to set the appropriate length or scope of sunset provisions.  Agencies, however, often im-
plement statutes, making the difficult regulatory choices in such regimes in the face of 
changing circumstances.  In the sunset-provision context, however, agencies are unable 
to exercise this advantage by changing the length of sunsets or by setting their scope.   
157 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 61-62 (1982) 
(arguing that sunset provisions merely shift the force of inertia to those who oppose 
regulation, rather than to those in the previous majority who support it). 
158 See S. REP. NO. 95-326, at 10, 51 (1977) (outlining senators’ disapproval of dele-
tion, including their belief that the deletion will allow programs with large budgets to 
avoid sunset review, and the senators’ intention to make a floor amendment to bring 
tax expenditures back within sunset review). 
159 See Gersen, supra note 10, at 268-71 (arguing that temporary legislation guards 
against cognitive bias).  Of course, interest groups will continue to exert influence in 
lobbying for or against use of a sunset, even when their use is relegated to only “new 
risk” legislation.  They will, for example, have a role in setting forth what constitutes a 
“new risk.”  
160 See Fagan, supra note 10, at 25 (“If we assume that legislatures and constituents 
sometimes irrationally perceive risk, and the basis of this perception is formed rationally 
within a previous environment . . . then a sunset clause could provide a way out of this 
temporal mismatch.”). 
161 Gersen, supra note 10, at 269. 
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formation regarding the risk is readily available, a phenomenon 
known in the behavioralism literature as the “availability heuristic.”162  
For instance, if news coverage of a terrorist attack is imprinted in the 
minds of citizens, they will, the theory goes, draw upon the availability 
of published images and stories and overestimate the likelihood and 
seriousness of future terrorist attacks.  Citizens, under this view, will 
then demand “too much” legislation or regulation based on their irra-
tional risk analysis.163  Some have suggested that making such legisla-
tion or regulation temporary will compensate for the cognitive bias:  
although congressional members may be forced politically to serve an 
irrational public, at least the legislation or regulation will be reeva-
luated when cooler heads prevail.164 
Scholars have also cited “framing effects” and “escalating com-
mitment” as causes for the “stickiness” of regulatory programs.165  As to 
the former, people have been shown to make inconsistent choices 
based on the format of the option, or the way it is “framed”; they tend 
to assign more value to losses than to equivalent forgone gains, a ten-
dency which is also referred to as loss aversion.166  Thus, interest-group 
beneficiaries of an extant regulatory program will lobby harder than 
                                                          
162 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON:  SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
33-35 (2002) (defining the “availability heuristic” as the phenomenon in which 
“people tend to think that events are more probable if they can recall an incident of 
their occurrence”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Available?  Social Influences and Be-
havioral Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2003) (explaining that the availability 
heuristic causes people to substitute deeper consideration of actual possibilities with 
accessible, illustrative examples); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability:  A 
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 230 (1973) (ob-
serving that individuals perceive an event as being more likely to occur if a similar event 
has recently occurred or if they have recently seen such an event in a film). 
163 See, e.g., Risa Palm, Demand for Disaster Insurance:  Residential Coverage (explaining 
that many individuals, rather than using cost-benefit analyses to make purchase deci-
sions for insurance, instead fall prey to biases that influence their estimates), in PAYING 
THE PRICE:  THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 51, 52-54 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth eds., 1998). 
164 See Gersen, supra note 10, at 271 (arguing that temporary legislation accounts 
for political realities while simultaneously serving to prevent “long-term institutional 
commitments”); Fagan, supra note 10, at 20-21 (recommending the use of sunset pro-
visions in uncertain environments where error costs may be high). 
165 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal 
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 603-06 (2002) (arguing that one benefit of 
sunset provisions is that they permit periodic review of status quo situations to which 
the public and legislators have grown attached). 
166 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 109, at 674 (describing loss aversion as when a 
person’s aversion to losses is greater than her attraction to similarly sized gains).   
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those who oppose reform.167  Moreover, “escalating commitment” will 
lead initial advocates of a position to believe irrationally in its contin-
ued advantages; otherwise, they would be forced to defend their orig-
inal decision, a cognitively costly demand.  Therefore, the architects 
and supporters of a regulatory regime may be unwilling to let it go, 
even when presented with evidence of its looming failure or ineffec-
tiveness.168  Because sunsets may be structured to shift the status quo to 
deregulation after a period of time, they are suggested as counter-
weights to these biases.169 
Despite the attractive logic behind these uses of sunset provisions, 
one can contest the initial premise supporting them; cognitive biases do 
not uniformly bring overreaction but may also lead to underreaction 
and undersupply of regulation.170  First, “biased assimilation” causes 
people to accept wholeheartedly evidence that supports their initial be-
lief while repudiating or downplaying contradictory evidence.171  This 
bias has been used to predict a lack of regulation in certain areas.  For 
example, to the extent that there is mixed evidence of global climate 
change and its predicted effects, such discrepancy may further polarize 
the public’s views on the topic.172  Because skeptics will remain skeptic-
al, it is unlikely that regulation on carbon emissions will occur; “the 
conflicting scientific evidence will likely stifle any response.”173   
Additionally, a recent study concludes that individuals’ basic val-
ues, including those associated with climate change, gun rights, public 
health, and national security, exert more influence over their risk per-
                                                          
167 See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 165, at 604-05 (noting that framing effects 
mean that “those who might lose the benefits of an existing program will fight harder 
than those who stand to benefit from its reform”).  
168 See id. at 605 (explaining that people are wary of acknowledging that their ini-
tial position was erroneous). 
169 See id. (noting that, although sunsets may be “too drastic a solution for many 
regulatory contexts,” they can help address individuals’ psychological attachment to 
the status quo). 
170 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 605, 634-35 (2003) (describing how cognitive error caused by the availability heu-
ristic could, in the case of a terrorist attack, lead people to fear infringements on civil 
liberties from increased reglations and thus underregulate). 
171 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
299, 304-05.    
172 See id. at 305-06 (using the example of global warming to demonstrate how 
doubters assign greater weight to studies confirming their own beliefs while believers 
similarly place greater weight on studies sympathetic to their views).   
173 Id. at 306-07.   
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ceptions than any other factor.174  For instance, “cultural worldviews 
accurately predict who is [a] global warming skeptic and who [is] a 
true believer:  hierarchs and individualists tend to dismiss the claim 
that global warming is occurring and is [a] serious threat to our socie-
ty, whereas egalitarians and communitarians take the opposite view.”175  
Hierarchs and individualists may simply perceive risk information 
through their cultural lens, leading them to support any deregulatory 
efforts.  In this manner, cultural polarization over new risks is likely.176 
Second, even if there is no divergence in evidence, loss aversion 
may mean that some will oppose regulation.177  Because they are at-
tached to the status quo, “[p]eople are willing to tolerate risks that 
they already bear, even though they would not otherwise be willing to 
incur the same risks.”178  Given that many environmental, health, and 
safety hazards only become known after a product or activity is already 
well established within society, individuals may perceive the “new risk” 
to be the regulatory prospect of banning or taxing the product or activ-
ity, rather than the hazard created by the product or activity itself.  The 
decades-long battles by lawmakers to regulate pervasive and harmful 
substances, such as lead, asbestos, and cigarettes, seem to support this 
view.  Additionally, because people are averse to incurring assured 
losses, in many instances, this phenomenon will also lead to reduced 
demand for risk regulation.179  For example, people will oppose fossil-
fuel reduction because it is a certain loss even when it avoids an un-
certain environmental loss of equal expected value. 
Third, reflecting a “myopia bias,” people tend to place more im-
portance on the avoidance of immediate losses than the avoidance of 
losses in the future,180 perhaps due to the previously discussed availa-
bility heuristic and their inability to imagine future losses.181  Again, 
this bias will influence people to choose to avoid immediate losses 
                                                          
174 See Dan M. Kahan et al., The Second National Risk and Culture Study:  Making 
Sense of—and Making Progress in—the American Culture War of Fact 4 (Oct. 3, 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017189. 
175 Id. at 3.  
176 See id. at 16 (“[B]ecause of the decisive influence of their worldviews on their 
risk perceptions, . . . people end up drawn into divisive forms of cultural conflict . . . .”). 
177 See Rachlinski, supra note 171, at 307 (noting that people are “relatively unwil-
ling to sacrifice benefits they already possess to obtain other benefits”). 
178 Id. at 308.   
179 See id. at 309 (“People are more willing to gamble to avoid a loss than to obtain 
a benefit.”). 
180 See David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1324-25 (2003).   
181 Id.   
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over nonimmediate losses of equal expected value, even taking ac-
count of the time value of money.182  Accordingly, this bias may lead to 
a choice against efficient regulation.  Fossil-fuel reduction, for in-
stance, produces immediate economic losses, which are weighed more 
heavily against future environmental losses of equal expected value.183  
Agency costs and institutional design that incentivize legislators to-
ward short-term goals may exacerbate such a bias as well. 
In short, the theory that temporary legislation is needed as a bul-
wark against these biases is, at the least, overstated.  As the above dis-
cussion demonstrates, biased assimilation, loss aversion, and myopia 
bias may result in constituents underreacting to new risk.  Hence, 
these behaviors may result in demand for a level of regulation below 
what would be efficient. 
C.  Determining the Length of Sunset Periods 
Finally, the improbability that sunset provisions will produce valu-
able information or flexible lawmaking opportunities can also be 
traced to the difficulty in choosing an appropriate length for the sun-
set period.  Theoretically, the sunset date should occur when a law 
begins to produce net costs in light of new information or intervening 
events.184  Identifying this point at the time of the sunset’s enactment, 
however, will prove challenging, if not prohibitively costly.  In contrast, 
a legislature can amend or repeal legislation when it no longer pro-
duces net benefits.185  Such actions may impose greater transaction costs 
than sunsetting the law, but these must be weighed against the costs of 
the sunset provision:  the costs of determining the correct sunset date 
and the other legislative burdens discussed throughout this Article. 
                                                          
182 Id. at 1325-26. 
183 See id. (“In theory at least, the myopia bias can be distinguished from the bias in 
favor of avoiding sure losses over unsure ones:  people may well overweigh immediate 
sure losses even as against non-immediate sure losses.”). 
184 See Fagan, supra note 10, at 21-22 (“Ceteris paribus, the higher the degree of un-
certainty or pace of change, the shorter the sunset clause should be in order to allow 
the legislature to implement the maximum amount of new policy options.  This flex-
ibility should be weighed against the transaction costs of creating new legislation and 
the transaction costs of periodic review.”). 
185 See, e.g., supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (discussing a congressional 
amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which lifted a travel ban upon 
HIV-positive foreign nationals). 
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IV.  DISADVANTAGES OF TEMPORARY LEGISLATION 
The above discussion has questioned the purported advantages of 
sunset provisions in producing fiscal prudence, better information, 
and legislative flexibility.  Recognizing, however, that lasting legisla-
tion lacks many of these characteristics as well, this Part continues a 
systematic comparison of these two legislative options.  In so doing, it 
finds severe, albeit sometimes nonobvious, disadvantages of temporary 
legislation relative to lasting legislation.   
A.  Political-Economy Concerns 
Prior literature theorizes that temporary legislation may increase 
interest-group activity.  Generally, public-choice theory posits that small 
groups are successful at obtaining legislation because they are more in-
terested and more easily organized than the general public—each 
member of which bears only a small cost of the interest-group legisla-
tion.186  Interest groups compensate legislators for their efforts toward 
enactment of the favored policy through campaign contributions, 
votes, and other benefits, collectively known as “rents.”187  Scholars (in-
cluding myself) have argued that temporary legislation, through conti-
nual threats of expiration, allows congressional members to extract 
more rents from interest groups than does lasting legislation.188   
One critique of this view is that lawmakers can also continually ex-
tract rents from interest groups by repeatedly threatening to repeal or 
alter lasting legislation.189  To the extent that lawmakers are extracting 
rents, however, such threats will not be as forceful as the threat of sun-
set.  It is much easier to let a sunset expire than to repeal or amend 
                                                          
186 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 23 (1991) 
(explaining how the “free rider” problem allows small interest groups to dominate the 
political discourse); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary 
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (discussing the negotia-
tion of legislative “deals” between Congress and interest groups); supra notes 149-52 
and accompanying text (describing the repeat interactions between interest groups 
and legislators in temporary-legislation situations). 
187 See Kysar, supra note 8, at 392 (“Through campaign contributions and lobbyists, 
these groups seek legislative votes favorable to their interests from politicians.”).  
188 See, e.g., id. at 394-95 (noting that legislators are able to provide hope to inter-
est groups when sunset dates approach and thereby can extract rents from both sides); 
Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch:  The New Logic of Col-
lective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1164-65 (2006) (arguing that Congress helps to 
create interest groups that it can later “shake down” for campaign contributions). 
189 See Yin, supra note 10, at 243-44 (suggesting that legislators might “enhance the 
amount of benefits they obtain from the private sector . . . [by] increas[ing] their use 
of threatened, but ultimately unexecuted, legislative actions”).   
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legislation.  The former requires no action and the latter requires pas-
sage in both houses and the signature of the President, not to mention 
various internal processes, including committee review, within each 
house.  The sunset can then be a more viable threat, requiring more 
rents to stave off its expiration.  For the same reason, reenacting tempo-
rary legislation requires more legislative resources and hence more 
rents than simply maintaining lasting legislation.  The effectiveness of 
recurring threats for temporary provisions is supported by anecdotal 
evidence from a lobbyist, who stated the following:  
Who wants to lose a client? . . . With [temporary tax provisions], you know you 
always have someone who will help pay the mortgage.  You go to the client, tell 
them you’re going to fight like hell for permanent extension, but tell them it’s 
a real long shot and that we’ll really be lucky just to get a six-month extension.  
Then you go to the Hill and strike a deal for a one-year extension.  In the end, 
your client thinks you’re a hero and they sign on for another year.190 
Lawmakers similarly benefit from this arrangement.  When asked by a 
staff member why tax extenders were not made permanent, one Con-
gress member responded,  
Are you kidding me? . . . We couldn’t do that! . . . Why, I’d lose all my 
friends! . . . Who would come visit me and say kind things to me and do 
nice things for me then, if they didn’t have to come back every year to 
ask for these tax provisions?!!191 
Because tax extenders benefit lobbyists, who can then justify being 
kept on retainer, and congressional members, who can continue to 
receive rents, such provisions are particularly susceptible to special in-
terests.  One estimate concludes that tax extenders transfer approx-
imately $30 billion a year to “a few special interests.”192  Indeed, so lu-
crative is this arrangement that when President Obama proposed in his 
2011 budget to make permanent the R&D tax credit, after nearly three 
decades of its continuous reenactment, Senate Republicans sent him a 
letter calling instead for extension and improvement of the credit.193 
To be sure, it seems reasonable to conclude that interest groups 
will value temporary legislation less than lasting legislation due to its 
                                                          
190 Pat Jones, New Day May Dawn for Sunset Tax Provisions, 66 TAX NOTES 1587, 1587 
(1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
191 Martin A. Sullivan, It Is Time to Make All Tax Extenders Permanent, 126 TAX NOTES 
139, 141 (2010) (alterations in original). 
192 Ryan Grim & Shahien Nasiripour, The K Street Kickback:  The Giveaway that Reid 
Stripped from the Jobs Bill, HUFFINGTON POST Feb. 12, 2010, http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/12/the-K-street-kickback-the_n_460652.html.  
193 Id.   
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shorter duration.194  However, scholars, including myself, have argued 
that campaign finance laws, which limit the amount of contributions a 
legislator can receive at a given time, cause legislators to push their 
constituents toward temporary legislation, the smoothing effect of 
which allows for greater contributions.195  Such an analysis therefore 
adopts an agency-cost model in which agent-legislators, faced with di-
vergent interests from principal-constituents, can exploit the informa-
tional asymmetries between themselves and voters, as well as the costs 
associated with monitoring legislator behavior, in order to pursue their 
own interests.196  Generally, however, under the campaign-finance laws, 
a lawmaker can capture more benefits from repeated contributions 
under temporary legislation than from one-time contributions. 
Some argue, though, that the proper comparison is between the 
following two scenarios:  (1) continuously sunsetting one piece of leg-
islation and (2) continuously enacting lasting legislation.197  The ra-
tionale is that there is possibly unlimited demand for legislative prod-
uct.198  If total future demand for legislation is unlimited, a legislator 
will not restrict legislative product by using temporary legislation in 
                                                          
194 See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING:  POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRAC-
TION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 88 (1997) (reiterating the benefits of longer term 
legislation, including better planning ability and reduced transaction costs).   
195 See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 8, at 394-95 (maintaining that sunset provisions may 
also be used to indirectly avoid campaign-finance limitations); McCaffery & Cohen, 
supra note 188, at 1179 (noting that because of campaign-finance limitations, Congress 
may prefer to get “paid” by lobbyists over the course of many years). 
196 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 & n.10 (1976) 
(defining agency costs as consisting of monitoring costs, bonding costs, and losses as-
sociated with the agency not working on behalf of the principal).  Note that an option 
to receive money in the future is not economically equivalent to receiving it up front.  
In addition to time-value-of-money considerations that would require future cash flows 
to be discounted, a legislator’s tenure may be shorter than the ten years required to 
realize the future rents, thereby further discounting the value of future rents.  That 
being said, high reelection rates drastically reduce this risk.  For instance, reelection 
rates in the House have averaged at approximately ninety-five percent over the past 
twenty years.  See Center for Responsive Politics, Reelection Rates Over the Years, OPEN-
SECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.php (last visited Jan. 15, 
2011) (charting reelection rates from 1964 to 2008).  Reelection rates for senators dur-
ing the same time period are a bit lower at approximately eighty-eight percent.  Id. 
197 See, e.g., Yin, supra note 10, at 243 (noting that legislators can seek rent from 
the private sector continually by holding out other legislative product for bargaining in 
future congressional sessions).   
198 See id. (commenting on the “potentially unlimited demand for legislative prod-
uct” in future congressional sessions). 
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the current term in order to preserve future demand.199  It is doubtful, 
however, that demand for legislative product is unlimited among any 
given legislator’s constituency.  Instead, each legislator likely has a few 
groups, either inside or outside her district, whose interests are strong 
enough to justify the payment of large-scale rents.200  Even where there 
is demand, perhaps from less powerful interest groups, it is questiona-
ble that this demand can produce rents as high as those that the pri-
mary lobbying forces in the relevant district pay.   
Even where a legislator does not extract rents in the above man-
ner, interest groups may value the recurrent short-term deals of tem-
porary legislation more than the long-term bargains of lasting legisla-
tion.  For instance, interest groups may avoid registration under the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 if they do not contribute a threshold 
amount to a lobbyist during a quarterly period.201  If the policy pur-
sued by the interest group is controversial to its shareholders or cus-
tomers, it may wish to engage in temporary deals with lobbyists and 
lawmakers to avoid drawing attention to the issues involved. 
Behavioral phenomena may also lead to an increase in the valua-
tion of temporary legislative deals.  In a similar situation, many ob-
servers criticize corporate management for overemphasizing short-
term earnings.202  Presumably, this emphasis on the short term occurs 
because shareholders lack other methods to evaluate corporate lea-
dership and instead focus on available information, such as quarterly 
earnings.203  It may also occur due to the myopia bias, discussed 
                                                          
199 See id. (“There is no reason for a legislature to place artificial restrictions on 
what it can produce in a current session . . . if it knows that there will be more-than-
sufficient demand at that later time.”).   
200 For statistics on campaign contributions by legislator, see Center for Respon-
sive Politics, Congress, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/ 
index.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).  My original analysis of 2008 data from the site 
concludes that individual senators received on average only 12.28% of their total polit-
ical action committee (PAC) donations from PACs donating $5000 or more.  The av-
erage senator received approximately seventeen such donations and the median sena-
tor received five such donations.  
201 Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, § 4, 109 Stat. 691, 696-97 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 1603 (2006)). 
202 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal 
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REV 1071, 1102-03 (1990) (criticizing corpo-
rate management’s increase in short-term earnings in order to enhance shareholder 
perception as “socially costly” and “myopic”). 
203 See id. at 1102 n.107 (“Increasing shareholder support by merely changing 
shareholder perceptions is, of course, only possible because shareholders lack perfect 
information.”). 
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above,204 which causes people to avoid current losses over future losses 
of equal expected value.205  Many also believe the market for corporate 
control, driven by shareholder desire for immediate gratification, 
forces managers and directors to magnify the importance of short-
term performance.206  These factors thus may lead businesses to dis-
count excessively future financial benefits while overvaluing those in 
the present.  To the extent that this theory is true, we can expect enti-
ties to value a long-term bargain less than a series of short-term bar-
gains of the same aggregate length.  Thus, emphasis upon short-term 
profits might lead lawmakers to receive higher rents from temporary 
rather than lasting legislation, since people seem to place greater val-
ue upon the more immediate benefits of temporary legislation.   
Another reason that the use of temporary legislation is uncontro-
versial may be that long-term legislation carries risks.  Scholars have 
previously identified three such risks:  (1) breach of the “contract” by 
the politician responsible for the legislation favoring the private inter-
est, (2) impossibility of performance due to the lawmaker’s failure to 
keep office, and (3) an increase in the number of legislative players 
who must be appeased.207  Scholars have offered these factors as a par-
tial explanation for the increasing rate of tax changes; essentially, pri-
vate interests prefer short-term bargains with lawmakers in order to 
avoid the greater risk that a long-term bargain will fail.208  One may ex-
tend this theory to predict that private interests will prefer a series of 
temporary legislative acts rather than lasting legislation (or at least that 
                                                          
204 See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text (explaining possible sources of 
the bias). 
205 See Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 
UCLA L. REV. 277, 313 (1990) (describing the belief of some courts that “myopic in-
vestors may create pressures on corporations to be correspondingly myopic in their 
investment behavior”).  
206 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control:  The Institutional Investor as Corpo-
rate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1327 & nn.200-01 (1991) (arguing that share-
holders often accept unfavorable proposals, like antitakeover proposals, when linked to 
short-term “sweeteners,” such as large dividends or stock repurchases); Martin Lipton & 
Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance:  The Quinquennial Election of 
Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 210 (1991) (arguing that managers aim to satisfy the 
short-term goals of investors and thus underinvest in capital expenditures, research and 
development, and new lines of business); cf. Hu, supra note 205, at 314-15, 332-49 (ar-
guing that cognitive biases encourage overinvestment as well as underinvestment).   
207 See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and De-
creasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 945-52 (1987) (noting that long-
term taxation contracts are risky because the politician may break his promise, a law-
maker may not be in office for the requisite time period, and ancillary contracts re-
quire more players to sign onto the law).   
208 Id. 
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they will not resist too strongly legislators’ and lobbyists’ attempts to 
foist temporary legislation on them in order to extract greater rents).   
Relatedly, actors may be wary of supporting lasting legislation for 
fear that its costs will outweigh their own ability to utilize long-term 
benefits, either because they are no longer necessary or because they 
become antithetical to their future priorities.  Jonathan Macey has 
theorized that interest groups will favor narrowly tailored, private-
interest-focused legislation but will not support broad constitutional 
rules, even where they promote rent-seeking.209  This result ensues be-
cause such constitutional rules may provide short-term benefits to the 
interest group but may fail to provide benefits in the longer term.  By 
lifting the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance,”210 temporary provisions be-
come more valuable to players who can be sure that they will use these 
paid-for benefits.   
B.  Entrenchment Issues 
A maxim in constitutional law holds that “one legislature may not 
bind the legislative authority of its successors”211—that is to say, legisla-
tures may not entrench their statutes.  To the extent that sunset provi-
sions allow an earlier legislature to terminate a statute, causing the law 
to revert to its prior incarnation (when the legislature at that time may 
not wish it to terminate), sunset provisions can fairly be characterized 
as entrenchment mechanisms.212  Yet constitutional law scholars do 
                                                          
209 See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation:  An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 246-47 (1986) (using ex-
amples from the airline industry to illustrate that “even special interest groups that 
might benefit from some specific, discrete legislative wealth transfers are likely to ob-
ject to general constitutional provisions”). 
210 See sources cited supra note 3. 
211 United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (citing 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *84). 
212 Compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Legislative Entrenchment:  A 
Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1676-78 (2002) (arguing that sunsets and legislative 
entrenchment are constitutionally indistinguishable), with Yair Listokin, Learning 
Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 536 (2008) (justifying the permissibility of 
sunset provisions and the impermissibility of legislative entrenchment on grounds 
that “sunsetting . . . enhances efficient policymaking”), and John O. McGinnis & Mi-
chael B. Rappaport, Essay, Symmetric Entrenchment:  A Constitutional and Normative 
Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385, 444 (2003) (distinguishing sunset provisions from en-
trenching provisions on the grounds that “[s]unset provisions raise none of the spe-
cial problems of public choice, aberrational majorities, partisanship, or imperfect 
psychological heuristics,” but noting that “an excessive use of sunset provisions might 
impose undue costs on future legislatures”).  For a general discussion on the entren-
chment prohibition, see Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate:  En-
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not attack sunset provisions on these grounds even though they bind 
future majorities by crowding out the legislative agendas of future 
Congresses.213  For instance, one study undertaken even prior to the 
dramatic increase in the use of sunset provisions concluded that temp-
orary legislation significantly constrained the agendas of fifty-six per-
cent of committee chairs.214   
Specifically, temporary legislation may interfere with the future 
majority’s ability to set its own agenda215 in the following manner:  if 
the current legislature passes temporary laws, then the future legisla-
ture must consider those it wishes to continue and perhaps devote 
some legislative resources to debating those it would like to let lapse.216  
                                                                                                                                 
trenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 381, which argues that the 
prohibition against entrenching enactments relates to a “temporal delegation of au-
thority conferred by periodic elections.” 
213 See Gersen, supra note 10, at 281-82 (positing that “temporary legislation trans-
fers the power of agenda control from the Congressional leadership in future Con-
gresses to the current-period legislature” since “[s]tatutory expirations constrain the 
discretion of committee chairs by mandating that certain items be placed on the com-
mittee’s agenda”).   
214 See Christine DeGregorio, Leadership Approaches in Congressional Committee Hear-
ings, 45 W. POL. Q. 971, 978 (1992) (reporting that committee chairs in the study felt 
that the review of expiring legislation, or the “reauthorization imperative,” detracted 
from the time dedicated to other matters in hearings). 
215 Transaction costs of temporary legislation, if higher than those of lasting legis-
lation, may also unduly burden future legislatures.  It is difficult, however, to arrive at a 
general conclusion regarding the costs of each.  There are two types of legislative 
transaction costs:  costs incurred when the legislation is enacted, or “enactment costs,” 
and costs arising postenactment from efforts to lobby for or against repeals or amend-
ments, or “maintenance costs.”  See Gersen, supra note 10, at 262-66 (analyzing and 
comparing the different levels of enactment and maintenance costs for both tempo-
rary and permanent legislation). 
 Initial enactment costs for lasting and temporary legislation may be equal because 
both types have to meet the same procedural requirements; it is more plausible, how-
ever, that temporary legislation has lower initial enactment costs because it tends to 
incite less political resistance.  Id. at 263-64.  Reenactment costs are greater for tempo-
rary legislation since lasting legislation does not result in such costs at all.  Id. at 263. 
 As for maintenance costs, it is easier to block repeal of legislation than to renew 
expiring provisions, especially on a continuous basis.  Id. at 264.  Accordingly, if re-
newal is the goal at sunset, then lasting legislation is less costly than temporary legisla-
tion.  Id. at 264-65.  Opponents of temporary legislation will not fight for repeal when 
it is far easier to block reenactment at the sunset date; this dynamic is especially true 
for shorter sunsets, when the opportunity to block reenactment is near and the disad-
vantages of keeping the legislation are few.  Id. at 265.  Accordingly, some temporary 
legislation will have lower maintenance costs than lasting legislation.  It is therefore 
difficult to conclude, from a theoretical perspective, which type of legislation is less 
costly to produce and maintain. 
216 Note that this entrenchment result would also ensue if the legislature did not 
pass any legislation.  The discussion at hand, however, is focused on the choice be-
tween lasting and temporary legislation. 
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If instead the current legislature had passed lasting legislation, the fu-
ture legislature would need to consider seriously only those provisions 
it wishes to repeal or amend.   
In this manner, the default result of lasting legislation is simply 
continued legislation.  By contrast, the default result of temporary leg-
islation is “delegislation,”217 an arguably more disruptive consequence 
due to entrenchment concerns.  This is because a sunset provision 
causes the law to return to its presunset state—that is, to return to the 
policy choices of prior “generations” of lawmakers.   
It is unclear whether a future majority will wish for termination of 
a past majority’s policy as opposed to continuation.  It is plausible that 
a future majority would favor the policies of the most recent genera-
tion of lawmakers over the policies of past generations.  If so, the fu-
ture majority would more often choose continuation over repeal.  
This hypothesis has some support in the law and economics litera-
ture, which theorizes that the common law trends toward efficient 
outcomes over time.218  Some economists have applied this theory to 
statutory law as well.219 
If a future majority indeed prefers the policies of recent genera-
tions, then sunset provisions may more deeply entrench the current 
majority than lasting legislation by flooding the legislative calendar 
with bills to reenact the expiring legislation.220  Moreover, it would be 
reasonable to assume that temporary legislation is easier to enact be-
cause it facilitates legislative compromise.221  If so, the supply of tem-
                                                          
217 The term “delegislation” is used here because sunsetting has a valence in favor 
of the expiration of legislation, given the difficulty to get Congress to act.  The legisla-
tion itself, however, could have any content—it could be deregulatory legislation that 
expires.  In such a case, the expiration of a sunset provision would lead to reregula-
tion rather than deregulation. 
218 See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient 
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977) (setting forth an early claim that the common law 
creates efficient rules).   
219 See, e.g., Jürgen Backhaus, Efficient Statute Law (showing that statutory law, un-
der certain circumstances, arrives at efficient outcomes), in ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS 23, 25-28 (Michael Faure & Roger Van den Bergh eds., 1989). 
220 See Yin, supra note 10, at 248-52 (discussing whether sunset provisions would 
“giv[e] each generation a freer hand in setting its own agenda”). 
221 Of course, there are other means to achieve compromise.  To illustrate, the 
estate-tax repeal could have been enacted as a lasting tax cut, with a higher exemption 
level, rather than as a temporary repeal.  Nonetheless, the temporariness was another 
means by which legislators could win the median voter’s support.  The political rhe-
toric against the “death tax” meant that even temporary repeal was preferable to a 
compromise on exemption levels.  See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 49, at 5-10, 260-
61 (chronicling the events that spurred legislative action to repeal the “death tax” and 
analyzing why the political movement for repeal was successful). 
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porary legislation may increase over time, thereby further burdening 
the legislative calendar. 
Such legislative business hence has the potential to “crowd[] out” 
the agenda of the future legislature.222  Additionally, when the future 
legislature permits a law to expire, it will likely have to adopt a new law 
to avoid the imposition of obsolete policies of prior generations, thus 
further burdening the new agenda.223 
Suppose that Congress enacted temporary tax legislation that re-
pealed the estate tax only during 2010, whereas previously the exclu-
sion amount for estates was $1 million.224  Further suppose that, close 
to the sunset date, December 31, 2010, a majority of Congress con-
cluded that a $3.5 million exclusion amount was the optimal tax.  The 
tax, however, would revert to the original $1 million exclusion amount 
if “veto gates,” or procedural obstacles to legislation, prevented 
amendment.  In such a case, assume that the expired legislation, which 
eliminated the estate tax, is more desirable than the older exclusion 
amount of $1 million, since a $3.5 million exemption level effectively 
exempts most estates from the estate tax.  Given the procedural diffi-
culty of renewing the temporary repeal or enacting new legislation 
with a $3.5 million exclusion amount, however, a sunset provision may 
force the reinstatement of the less desirable outcome. 
Moreover, if a majority of Congress prefers the extension of the 
repeal, as opposed to the older law establishing an exclusion amount 
of $1 million, it may find that the sunset date reduces the flexibility it 
has in deciding when to address the issue.  For instance, suppose con-
gressional members planned in 2010 to renew the repeal in the fall of 
that year.  In the aftermath of a hypothetical terrorist attack in that 
year, however, further assume that Congress must also enact complex 
antiterrorism legislation in that time frame.  Because of limited legis-
lative resources, members of Congress may find it difficult to devote 
sufficient resources to both issues. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to conclude with certainty that tempo-
rary legislation impermissibly entrenches the current majority.  The 
                                                          
222 Yin, supra note 10, at 251.   
223 Id. at 252.   
224 I abstract this hypothetical, although altered, from current events.  See, e.g., 
I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2006) (raising the estate-tax exclusion amount, in phased-in incre-
ments, from $1 million in 2002 to $3.5 million in 2009). Compare Economic Growth 
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501, 115 Stat. 38, 69 (2001) 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2210 (2006)) (repealing the estate tax in 2010), with 
id. § 901 (sunsetting such repeal after just one year, after which the estate-tax exclusion 
amount would return to 2000 levels). 
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entrenchment concerns outlined above are based upon a controver-
sial premise—that the policy preferences of an immediately prior 
generation are preferable to the ones of generations ago.  Even if one 
agrees that the common law becomes increasingly efficient, many 
proponents of this view have argued that statutory law is less likely to 
follow this course because legislators, unlike judges, are less insulated 
from interest groups.225  Such groups tend to advocate for their own 
agenda rather than for the efficient outcome.226   
Moreover, the prior congressional decision to sunset the laws may 
be said to reflect the preferences of that generation.  Thus, even if the 
future Congress prefers the policies of the previous Congress, such 
policies include the decision to sunset a law.  It may therefore be useful 
to draw a distinction between temporary legislation intended by the 
previous Congress to be temporary at the outset and legislation 
enacted in temporary form solely for budget purposes but intended to 
be permanently renewed.  For example, a short-term stimulus provi-
sion, such as a tax holiday, may be less offensive from an entrench-
ment perspective than the continually renewed R&D credit.   
Furthermore, temporary legislation may reduce entrenchment 
concerns.  Lasting legislation also entrenches, to an extent, the prefe-
rences of the current majority because it is continually in effect until a 
future Congress expends the resources to repeal it—a costly endeavor.  
Relatedly, one can also see temporary legislation as decreasing the 
current majority’s influence by creating greater risks that the legisla-
tion will be altered through the future majority’s failure to reenact, a 
proposition made likely by the procedural difficulty in passing legisla-
tion.  Temporary legislation may also provide a means by which the 
later Congress can pursue its own agenda.227  For instance, the con-
stant need to pass a tax-extenders bill provides the future Congress 
with a vehicle to which it can attach other tax items, giving members 
more opportunities to logroll their preferences.228 
                                                          
225 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 560 (7th ed. 2007) 
(“Although the correlation is far from perfect, judge-made rules [i.e., common law 
rules] tend to be efficiency-promoting while those made by legislatures . . . tend to be 
efficiency-reducing.”). 
226 Id. at 560-61. 
227 See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 10, at 282 (acknowledging that insertion of sunset 
provisions creates “the risk that future legislatures will change the substance of legisla-
tion”).   
228 For example, at the beginning of 2010, Republican senators attached retroac-
tive reenactment of expired extenders to their version of a jobs bill.  See Christine Gri-
maldi, Grassley to Move Delayed Tax Extenders as Alternative or Amendments to Jobs Bill, 29 
DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 16, 2010, at G-2; see also Grim & Nasiripour, supra note 192 (quot-
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One could further argue that each generation should be freed 
from the obligations prioritized by prior generations and that sunset 
provisions effectuate that result.  Congressional commitment to Social 
Security in the 1930s surely has limited the legislative options available 
to subsequent Congresses.  Although this argument seems intuitively 
correct, in this case the alternative option—to sunset Social Security 
after, say, ten years—seems nonsensical.  Social Security would not 
function as a retirement vehicle if people could not rely upon its con-
tinuance.  A sunset provision would signal that the legislature was not 
committed to the long-term survival of the legislation, hence dooming 
it.  It is the public’s reliance interest (which is necessary to the success 
of the legislation), not the lack of a sunset, that creates the primary 
entrenching effect of this hypothetical.   
Because both temporary and lasting legislation have entrenching 
qualities as well as countervailing features, the difficulty lies in deter-
mining when the level of entrenchment of each becomes impermissi-
ble.229  Michael Klarman identifies a distinction “between today’s ma-
jority exercising sovereignty over the present in a way that unavoidably 
affects the future and today’s majority seeking direct control over the 
future in a manner that is unnecessary to implementing its complete 
control over the present.”230  Klarman concludes that, because the 
“burden of inertia in repealing existing legislation is [an] unavoidable 
consequence of a present generation’s right to control the present,” 
such entrenchment is permissible.231  The alternative—a requirement 
that all legislation be temporary—would simply favor delegislation 
due to inertia and procedural hurdles, continuing to entrench the 
current majority as discussed above.  
Nonetheless, the two types of legislation may not have equal en-
trenching qualities.  Using Klarman’s distinction, such qualities in 
lasting legislation appear to be more necessary to implement the cur-
rent majority’s control over the present.  For instance, the entrench-
                                                                                                                                 
ing a senior research associate at the Tax Policy Center as stating that the annual need 
to reenact extenders can be a “useful political vehicle” to which to add pet projects be-
cause “[t]hese are considered must-pass bills”).  
229 Cf. Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law:  Binding Local 
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 8) (on file with au-
thor) (arguing that because entrenchment exists along “a continuum,” one must an-
swer the more difficult question of “when should entrenchment be allowed”). 
230 Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review:  The Entrenchment Problem, 85 
GEO. L.J. 491, 505 (1997); see also CALABRESI, supra note 157, at 59-65 (exploring alter-
native ways in which legislators can identify and remedy laws that need reworking or 
reconsideration). 
231 Klarman, supra note 230, at 505 n.66.   
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ment qualities in lasting legislation allow the government to make a 
credible commitment to persons who can then rely on that promise.  
In this manner, lasting legislation may reduce the costs of some gov-
ernment contracts by promoting stability.232  The entrenchment fea-
tures of lasting legislation also make government itself more stable by 
reducing volatility in the law.233  Madison seemed to support this view 
and wrote that, as a sunset date nears, “all the rights depending on 
positive laws, that is, most of the rights of property . . . become abso-
lutely defunct, and the most violent struggles ensue between the par-
ties interested in reviving, and those interested in reforming the an-
tecedent state of property.”234 
In contrast, temporary legislation attempts no commitment what-
soever to an intended legislative outcome, other than reversion to prior 
law.  The entrenchment features of temporary legislation, however, do 
provide benefits.  They may allow Congress to control the transition 
costs of future policy changes.  By ascertaining a relatively certain point 
at which Congress will contemplate a modification to the current legal 
regime, the objects of the legislation may thus better anticipate the tim-
ing of such change.235  Here again, though, we might distinguish be-
tween legislation intended to be truly temporary and legislation enacted 
in temporary form solely for budget purposes.  The latter category pre-
sumably does not assist Congress in dampening transition costs since 
Congress does not intend the legislation to be temporary.   
Additionally, the latter category more likely sustains excessive in-
terest-group influence across time since it is not responding to a par-
ticular event or emergency around which interest groups can coa-
                                                          
232 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 212, at 1670-73 (discussing the advantages of 
legislation that results in entrenchment). 
233 Id. at 1672. 
234 Id. at 1671 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 
1790), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER:  SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT 
OF JAMES MADISON 230, 232 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973)). 
235 See Gersen, supra note 10, at 275 n.107 (“Because sunsetting tax provisions do 
not give rise to the same expectations of permanence, they may mitigate problems 
associated with transition policy in the tax realm.”).  See generally DANIEL SHAVIRO, 
WHEN RULES CHANGE (2000) (combining economics and political science to devise a 
working framework under which transition policy can best be effectuated in the fed-
eral income tax system); Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions:  The Case of Retroactivity in 
Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977) (exploring how the effective dates of 
changes in income tax laws impact wealth, and arguing against grandfathered effec-
tive dates); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
509 (1986) (arguing for an efficiency model of legal transitions and contending that 
the market, not the government, should rectify losses incurred by a party as a result of 
changes in public policy). 
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lesce.  This problem is compounded by the fact that benefits related 
to temporary legislation’s ability to signal policy change may also ac-
crue problematically to interest groups—at the expense of the public.  
A primary fear of entrenchment is that a minority group may success-
fully influence legislation into the future, thereby burdening unorga-
nized majorities.236  Lasting legislation, however, protects against this 
prospect to some degree.  By making it difficult to identify precisely 
future beneficiaries and harmed parties, lasting legislation places in-
terest groups in a state akin to the original position, behind the Rawl-
sian “veil of ignorance.”237  In contrast, because temporary legislation 
signals when the policy will change, the ability of private parties to 
identify the winners and losers will heighten, thus increasing the 
supply of private-regarding legislation.  Moreover, the use of tempo-
rary legislation is elective in the sense that current lawmakers and in-
terest groups can choose which legislation has a sunset as well as the 
length of the sunset period.   
To summarize, it is clear that both temporary and lasting legisla-
tion produce entrenchment issues.  Yet temporary legislation, espe-
cially when enacted solely for budget reasons rather than in response 
to an emergency or crisis, contains entrenchment features perhaps 
more troubling in nature because such legislation tends to lack the 
benefits that might otherwise justify such entrenchment. 
C.  Planning Disruptions 
Finally, temporary legislation also complicates planning activities.  
First, temporary legislation indicates that Congress is not committed to 
the durability of a policy.  Lasting legislation, on the other hand, may 
function as a precommitment device, such as in our Social Security ex-
ample discussed above,238 by binding legislators to future obligations.  
This ability to precommit is vital to planning the organization of a 
complex economy and culture, such as our own, throughout a num-
ber of years.  The coordination of broad social policies—such as social 
security, health care, and employment—across the economy requires 
a degree of stability, which varying sunset provisions could disrupt.  
For instance, it would be difficult to have planned health care reform 
                                                          
236 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 212, at 1690 (discussing one scholar’s con-
cerns that when “tax policy was temporarily in the hands of powerful pro-business in-
terest groups,” those interest groups had the opportunity to create laws interfering 
with “the power of future majorities” not yet organized).   
237 See sources cited supra note 3. 
238 See supra Section IV.B. 
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without sensing our future commitments to social security.  Tempo-
rary legislation may therefore stifle legislative ability to engage in long-
term planning. 
In addition, temporary legislation disrupts the planning activities 
of those it impacts.  Although citizens should always expect some tur-
moil in the law, unlike repeal or amendment of laws, sunset provisions 
do not require affirmative action by Congress for the law to change.  
They thus decrease the durability of the law and increase compliance 
burdens.239  For instance, they may incentivize taxpayers to obtain costly 
tax advice to shift income and deductions between years in avoidance 
of a sunset date.240  Temporary provisions also distort investment deci-
sions.241  Indeed, certain publicly traded corporations identify sunset-
ting tax provisions as material risks to their business.  In its annual re-
port to investors, for instance, General Electric disclosed the following 
warning in the risk factor section of its filing:  
 [A beneficial tax provision] is scheduled to expire at the end of 2008, 
has been scheduled to expire on four previous occasions, and each time 
it has been extended by Congress.  If this provision is not extended, the 
current U.S. tax imposed on active financial services income earned out-
side the United States would increase, making it more difficult for U.S. 
financial services companies to compete in global markets.242  
Some have suggested that, to ameliorate this problem, Congress 
could vote early to extend temporary legislation, thereby easing the 
transition for taxpayers and other affected parties.243  Unfortunately, 
                                                          
239 Of course, some areas of law, like taxation, experience immense change even 
when enacted as lasting legislation.  See Yin, supra note 10, at 232-33 (discussing the 
numerous changes to tax legislation since the 1950s); see also Doernberg & McChesney, 
supra note 207, at 923-24 (explaining the accelerating rate of tax reform and change).  
That is not to say, however, that such legislative change would be no greater with tem-
porary legislation.   
240 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 36, at 405.  For instance, concern about 
the continuation of the AMT “patch” has caused tax advisors to recommend bunching 
certain expenditures into a year in which the patch is certain to apply, thus ensuring 
their deductibility.  Id.   
241 See Edward Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress:  How Tax Expenditures 
Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 17, 2009, available 
at LEXIS, 2009 TNT 94-40 (discussing the underinvestment in alternative energy due 
to the temporariness of the tax subsidies supporting such energy initiatives).  It is un-
clear whether temporary provisions uniformly increase or decrease investment.  See 
Yin, supra note 9, at 244-48.  However, none dispute that they distort investment.  Of 
course, both over- and underinvestment will result in inefficiencies. 
242 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., GE ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 81 (2007). 
243 See, e.g., Yin, supra note 10, at 233 (“By taking explicit, ‘early’ action on a future 
expiration, Congress would . . . send an especially strong message of an intention for 
stability in the law.”).   
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Congress already has tremendous difficulty with renewing the extend-
ers and thereby cannot ensure seamless renewal on time, let alone ear-
ly.244  Often Congress passes the extenders, such as the R&D tax credit, 
late so that they have retroactive effective dates.245  Such retroactive re-
newals create heavy administrative costs to taxpayers and may even 
jeopardize financing arrangements.246  Furthermore, taxpayers may 
decide to increase recordkeeping in the hopes that a lapsed tempo-
rary provision will be retroactively renewed.247  One should consider 
such planning difficulties in the assessment of temporary legislation. 
V.  RECOMMENDATION 
In light of the aforementioned critiques of temporary legislation, 
lasting legislation should be the statutory norm.  Specifically, this Ar-
ticle aims to attune legislative actors to the problems of temporary leg-
islation so that its passage is cautiously informed and carefully consi-
dered.  This Article therefore recommends a policy presumption 
against temporary legislation and in favor of lasting legislation.  Re-
cognizing that a legislative rule formalizing such a presumption would 
itself be endogenous and hence vulnerable to intense congressional 
pressures to revise any such statement (due to pressures to spend), 
this Article instead seeks to change underlying congressional norms.248  
It challenges favorable accounts of temporary legislation by construct-
                                                          
244 See Betty M. Wilson, TEI Testimony at Finance Committee Hearing on Tax Code Com-
plexity, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 26, 2001, available at LEXIS, 2001 TNT 82-58 (labeling 
extenders as “on-again, off again” provisions). 
245 See, e.g., David L. Cameron, Research Tax Credit:  Statutory Construction, Regulatory 
Interpretation and Policy Incoherence, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 63, 66 n.7 (2004) (listing 
the legislative history of the R&D tax credit).   
246 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 36, at 405 (detailing how late-year 
tax-law changes burden both public and private actors since the IRS may not have time 
to revise its forms, tax preparation software companies may not be able to update their 
products, and taxpayers may not be able to adjust their activities to take advantage of 
tax benefits). 
247 For instance, the R&D tax credit does not apply to expenses incurred between 
June 30, 1995, and July 1, 1996, because the legislature did not retroactively extend the 
credit.  Cameron, supra note 245, at 66 n.7. 
248 In so doing, this Article does not reject the ability of legislative rules to register 
and reinforce norms but instead posits that due to their endogeneity, legislative rules 
must be supported by such norms to avoid instability and gamesmanship.  One could 
argue, for example, that Congress enacts legislative rules as statutes, rather than as 
simple resolutions in each House, as a symbolic indication of strong congressional 
support of the behavioral limits therein. 
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ing a model of the legislative process, thereby informing the beliefs of 
lawmakers and their constituents.249   
The policy presumption against temporary legislation will be 
stronger as applied to tax cuts.  Sunset provisions enacted in the tax 
legislative context are typically meant to address revenue concerns ra-
ther than to impart legislative flexibility.250  Hence, temporary tax-
relief provisions more readily produce the pathologies in the political 
process outlined above.  Such sunset provisions, lacking a traditional 
policy justification, do not have a natural end date.  This attribute 
creates substantial uncertainty regarding the sunset date and there-
fore causes planning disruptions.  Lawmakers and lobbyists will also 
more easily pursue and exploit the continued reenactment of such 
temporary legislation as a result of the disconnect between the sunset 
date and any factor external to the budget process, which would oth-
erwise limit the length of renewal.  Moreover, because such sunset 
provisions are not enacted for legislative review or in response to a 
particular event, it is more likely that the future Congress will not see 
its role as meaningful at the sunset date and that the enacting Con-
gress will not reap the benefits that entrenchment offers.  Nonethe-
less, the later Congress will expend its precious resources reenacting 
the legislation, thereby supplanting its own legislative agenda.   
At times, however, it may be necessary to employ temporary legis-
lation.  In crisis situations,251 for example, temporary legislation will 
likely help to build coalitions quickly, to provide a check on a legisla-
ture in dealing with hurriedly drafted and enacted legislation, and to 
return automatically the statutory scheme to the status quo once the 
emergency has dissipated.252  Additionally, when Congress intends to 
legislate in an experimental manner, temporary legislation may be 
                                                          
249 Therefore, implicit within this Article’s recommendation is the view that the 
preferences of congressional members encompass their own ideologies and those of 
their constituents, in addition to the goal of accumulating rents.  See supra note 152 
and accompanying text (positing that public-choice theory must consider the ideologi-
cal preferences of lawmakers). 
250 Congress makes some tax cuts temporary to respond to emergencies.  However, 
these are vastly overshadowed by tax cuts made temporary for other reasons, such as 
budgetary or interest-group pressures.  See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra 
note 6, at 2-16 (listing 179 expiring general tax provisions and only 22 expiring disas-
ter-relief tax provisions). 
251 Crisis situations may be natural or manmade, thus including earthquakes, fi-
nancial downturns, and terrorist acts.   
252 See Fagan, supra note 10, at 32-40 (describing the leniency that is afforded to 
the enactment of temporary, emergency legislation throughout American history). 
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appropriate.253  In these instances, the presumption against temporary 
legislation should be relaxed.254   
In dealing with a crisis situation, a legislature is more likely to iden-
tify better the appropriate breadth and length of the sunset by keying 
its terms to the emergency event.  Emergency sunset provisions are less 
likely to entrench the legislature since there is less need to renew or 
revisit the issue—and thus less concern about the crowding out of fu-
ture policy items.  Additionally, a continued coalescence of interest 
groups will be more difficult to sustain once the emergency passes.  
Finally, a defined, precipitating factor will create more certainty re-
garding the sunset date and will therefore ease planning considera-
tions.  Nonetheless, the story of the tax extenders should serve as a 
cautionary tale.  Although legitimate pressures may produce tempo-
rary legislation, more nefarious forces may lobby successfully for its 
continuance.255  Without meaningful review, such legislation, like a 
phoenix, will be renewed perpetually from the ashes.   
                                                          
253 An alternative way of categorizing acceptable uses of temporary legislation is 
when lawmakers originally intend the legislation to be temporary, as opposed to per-
manent.  See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text. 
254 An example of when Congress used temporary legislation in response to a crisis 
is the antiterrorist legislation known as the USA PATRIOT Act, passed in response to 
the attacks on the United States in September 2001, with the goal of expanding the 
investigatory power of law enforcement, the discretion of authorities to detain and de-
port suspected terrorists, and the ability of the Treasury Department to regulate suspi-
cious financial transactions.  See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).  Many of its provisions were subject to 
a four-year sunset period, id. § 224(a), 115 Stat. at 295, because of concerns over civil 
liberties threatened by the Act.   
255 Perhaps avoiding such failures in the use of sunset provisions, Bruce Ackerman 
has proposed the adoption of an emergency statute, termed an “emergency constitu-
tion,” in which Congress bestows upon the executive the unilateral power to declare an 
emergency.  Bruce Ackerman, Essay, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 
1047-49 (2004).  This delegation would expire, however, within two weeks of the emer-
gency, unless a majority vote in both houses permits otherwise.  Id.  Reauthorization 
would then require escalating supermajority votes every two months.  Id. at 1049.  As a 
framework statute, this type of legislation prescribing sunset provisions would likely 
be more successful than adding sunset provisions to specific types of legislation at the 
height of the crisis.  Id. at 1048-49.  Because the legislation is procedural and anticipa-
tory in nature, Congress could adopt it behind a quasi–veil of ignorance, thus reduc-
ing the opportunities to sunset with the purpose of extracting rents or other self-
dealing.  Id. at 1048.  However, a procedural sunset provision may be overly broad, en-
compassing inappropriate situations.  Moreover, escalating supermajority require-
ments may require too many legislative resources upon each reauthorization. 
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CONCLUSION 
In summary, this Article has argued that temporary legislation 
lacks many of the benefits that recent scholarship claims.  Proponents 
of temporary legislation have contended that it enhances fiscal re-
sponsibility because its official-cost estimates reflect the full cost of 
such legislation, unlike official-cost estimates of lasting legislation, 
which do not reflect costs beyond the budget window.  However, many 
factors—the endogeneity of the budget process that leads to shifting 
baselines, PAYGO exceptions, the many costs that temporary legislation 
engenders beyond the budget window, and the inability of lawmakers to 
consider the full cost of all types of legislation—thwart the alleged re-
straining effect of temporary legislation.  What is more, sunset provi-
sions tend not to provide lawmakers with enhanced information or flex-
ibility:  ex ante, lawmakers will likely be unable to determine the 
appropriateness of the sunset, as well its proper scope and length.   
Finally, in addition to lacking the advantages that other scholars 
assert, sunset provisions have deleterious effects on the public and 
private sectors.  Specifically, their use increases the offer and extrac-
tion of rents from interest groups, entrenches current majoritarian 
preferences, and complicates the planning activities of those affected.  
For these reasons, this Article advances a policy presumption against 
temporary legislation and in favor of lasting legislation.  Doing so 
necessarily places trust in most cases (at least compared with the al-
ternative of temporary legislation) in the constitutional process by 
which our legislature can amend or repeal a law in a deliberative 
manner.  Heretofore, this architecture has ensured a statutory scheme 
that has adapted over time to remarkably changing environs.  It has 
created lasting, yet living, legislation. 
 
